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Article 3

Illinois Venue Reform: Not Tort Reform Rants
Keith H. Beyler*

INTRODUCTION

Judicial Hellholes@ is a term coined by the American Tort Reform
Association ("ATRA") to refer to places where it thinks that judges
apply the laws and court procedures unfairly against defendants in civil
suits.' Cook County, Illinois, appeared on ATRA's Judicial Hellholes
List for six straight years, and now appears on the Watch List of places
that could return to the Judicial Hellholes List.2 Three other Illinois
counties-Madison County, St. Clair County, and McLean Countyappear on the latest Judicial Hellholes List. 3 According to ATRA,
Judicial Hellholes have fifteen characteristics, the first of which is
judge-condoned forum shopping.4 By this, ATRA means that plaintiffs
file personal injury suits with little or no connection to the jurisdiction,
and the judges neither dismiss these suits nor transfer them to a more
* Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law; A.B. 1969 Princeton
University; J.D. 1974 University of Chicago Law School. The author thanks his colleagues Jill
Adams, Cheryl Anderson, Alice Noble-Allgire, Suzanne Schmitz, and Bill Schroeder for their
comments on drafts.
1.

AM.

TORT

REFORM

FOUND.,

JUDICIAL

HELLHOLES

(2011/2012),

available at

http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Judicial-Hellholes-201 1.pdf (last
visited Apr. 19, 2012) [hereinafter JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2011/2012]. The American Tort
Reform Foundation is the American Tort Reform Association's education arm. See ATR
Foundation, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES, http://www.judicialhellholes.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 19,

2012) ("The primary purpose of the Foundation is to educate the general public about how the
American civil justice system operates.").
2. JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2011/2012, supra note 1, at 25-26; AM. TORT REFORM FOUND.,
JUDICIAL HELLHOLES (2010/2011), available at http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-

content/uploads/2010/12/JH201 0.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2012).
3.

JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2011/2012, supra note 1, at 20-22, 25-26.

4. Id. at 42-43. ATRA lists the following characteristics: (1) judge-condoned forum
shopping, (2) adoption of novel legal theories, (3) discovery abuse, (4) inappropriate
consolidation and joinder, (5) improper class certification, (6) unfair case scheduling, (7) uneven
application of evidentiary rules, (8) admission of junk science, (9) improper or slanted jury
instructions, (10) excessive damages, (11) permitting inappropriate suits under loosely-worded
consumer protection laws, (12) permitting inappropriate public nuisance claims, (13) expansion
of damages, (14) state Attorney General alliances with the personal injury bar, and (15) cozy
relations among judges, personal injury lawyers, and public officials. Id
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appropriate jurisdiction. 5 In ATRA's view, the cure for Judicial
Hellholes is the enactment of its tort reform agenda-a limit on
noneconomic damages, abolition of joint and several liability, health
care liability reform, and so forth.6
ATRA's views on forum shopping are expectedly one-sided.
Because the results of litigation vary from county to county, both
plaintiffs and defendants forum shop.7 Plaintiffs sue whenever possible
in counties where the juries and judges are expected to favor greater tort
liability, and, whenever possible, defendants seek transfer to counties
where the juries and judges are expected to favor less tort liability.
Therefore, both the expectation of greater tort liability and the
expectation of lesser tort liability encourage forum shopping. These
expectations are based on county-to-county differences in the residents'
socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., predominantly blue collar versus
predominantly white collar), which can lead to the selection of
significantly different juries and the election of significantly different
judges.
There is nothing improper about a party wanting to have the merits of
its claim or defense decided in a county where it expects the
socioeconomic characteristics to yield a "community judgment"
favoring its side. The end result, however, is that time and money are
spent on procedural maneuvers that delay litigation and increase its cost.
A further result is deep anger on the part of business-oriented groups,
who conclude the law favors their opponents' forum shopping and
skews the administration of justice against them.
ATRA's tort reform agenda is not a cure for forum shopping; it sets
aside the community judgment about tort liability, not just in a county
with little or no connection to a suit, but also in a county with an
5. Id. ATRA does not spell out how this occurs, but ATRA undoubtedly means that plaintiffs
take advantage of liberal personal jurisdiction statutes and venue statutes to sue in plaintifffriendly places, the judges there deny most of the defendants' interstate and intrastate forum non
conveniens motions, and these discretionary rulings are hard to get overturned on appeal.
6.

AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, http://www.atra.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 19,

2012). ATRA thinks America's civil justice system compromises access to affordable health
care, raises the cost of goods and services, chills innovation, and undermines personal
responsibility. Id. Its complete reform agenda includes: (1) health care liability reform, (2) class
action reform, (3) promotion of jury service, (4) abolition of joint and several liability, (5)
abolition of the collateral source rule, (6) limits on punitive damages, (7) limits on noneconomic
damages, (8) product liability reform, (9) appeal bond reform, (10) sound science in the
courtroom, and (11) stopping regulation through litigation. Id.
7. See First American Bank v. Guerine, 764 N.E.2d 54, 61 (111. 2002) (citing Torres v. Walsh,
456 N.E.2d 601, 607 (Ill. 1983) and quoting Gordon E. Maag, Forum Non Conveniens in Illinois:
A HistoricalReview, Critical Analysis, and Proposal For Change, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 461, 510

(2001)).
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overwhelming connection to a suit. For example, a $500,000 limit on
noneconomic damages in a medical malpractice suit limits what a jury
can award not just in a county where one of the medical defendants has
a slight connection, but also in a county where all of the medical
defendants have a strong connection and where all of the alleged
negligent acts occurred. The cure for forum shopping is venue reform,
which emphasizes the need for a strong connection between the county
and the transaction or the parties for proper venue. The case for venue
reform is easily made without lashing out at counties that favor greater
tort liability. Unlike one major tort reform proposal, venue reform
proposals generally do not violate the Illinois Constitution.' This
Article proposes two alternative venue reforms: (1) convenience-based
proposals, which accept venue law's traditional defendant-convenience
and witness-convenience policies but change all venue rules that fail to
protect or overprotect convenience; and (2) anti-forum shopping
proposals, which reject convenience policies and limit venue in highervalue personal injury suits to the county (or counties) with the most
significant connection to the occurrence and the parties.
In Illinois, the general venue statute provides for residence-based
venue in a county where any defendant resides, and for transactionbased venue in a county where the transaction (or part of it) occurred
out of which the cause of action arose. 9 According to the Illinois
Supreme Court, residence-based venue is designed to serve the
convenience of the defendant, and transaction-based venue is designed
to serve the convenience of the witnesses to the transaction.10 However,
the statute's venue rules often defeat these purposes. Six instances
stand out.
8. A venue statute that is sufficiently burdensome and unreasonable can deny due process, but
the only venue statute ever held by the Illinois Supreme Court to deny due process was a unique,
special venue statute that had fixed venue in all of the state commission's guaranteed student loan
collection suits in a single county (Cook County), which often was remote from the defendant's
residence and the place where the substantial parts of the loan transaction had occurred. See
Williams v. Ill. State Scholarship Comm'n, 563 N.E.2d 465, 473-85 (Ill. 1990) ("ISSC's practice
of filing all its collection actions in Cook County is improper under the general venue statute.").
The venue reforms proposed here bear no resemblance to that unique special venue statute. On
the other hand, the Illinois Supreme Court has determined three times that one major item on the
tort reform agenda-a limit on noneconomic damages-violates the Illinois Constitution. See
Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., 930 N.E.2d 895, 914 (Ill. 2010) (violating the Illinois
Constitution's separation of powers clause); Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1078
(Ill. 1997) (violating the Illinois Constitution's special legislation clause); Wright v. Cent.
DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (Ill. 1976) (violating the Illinois Constitution's special
legislation clause).
9. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101 (2010) (requiring good faith joinder for residence-based
venue).
10. Langenhorst v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 848 N.E.2d 927, 933 (Ill. 2006).
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(1) The Registered Office Problem. A private corporation resides,
Many
among other places, where it has its "registered office.""
corporations use an outside entity with expertise in processing legal
papers as their registered agent.12 These corporations have their
registered office at the outside entity's place of business, which may be
located in another city and county.13 If so, the registered office rule
allows for suits against the corporation- in that other county. The
convenience of the corporation is not served, however, by defending
suits where an independent entity has its place of business. The
convenience of the corporation is served by defending suits where the
corporation has its own place of business. For example, in a suit arising
from medical treatment at a hospital in Sangamon County (Springfield),
the hospital's parent corporation was using an outside entity as its
registered agent.14 The outside entity had its place of business in Cook
County (Chicago), where neither the hospital nor its parent corporation
had a place of business.' 5 Thus, the convenience of the hospital was not
served by defending the suit in Cook County instead of Sangamon
County.16
(2) The Small Office Problem. A private corporation, partnership, or
unincorporated association resides, among other places, where the entity
has an "office." 17 The term "office" is interpreted to mean any fixed
place where the entity conducts its affairs. 18 Many entities have a
relatively large place of business in one county and a relatively small
place of business in another county.19 For entities with places of
11. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102(a) (2010).
12. See Corporations, WOLTERS KLUWER CORPORATE LEGAL SERVICES, http://ct.wolter

skluwer.com/ctcorporation/corporations (last visited on Apr. 19, 2012) (claiming that CT
Corporation serves as a registered agent for over 70% of Fortune 1000 companies and thousands
of small and medium businesses).
13. See id. (listing 208 South LaSalle Street, Chicago as CT Corporation's one location in
Illinois).
14. Torres v. Walsh, 456 N.E.2d 601, 603-04 (Ill. 1983).
15. Id. at 603.
16. See id. at 608 (upholding the Circuit Court's authority to transfer the case to Sangamon
County).
17. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102(a)-(c) (2010). The other rules about residence vary for
these entities. Id.
18. Melliere v. Luhr Bros., Inc., 706 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (finding a corporation
in the construction business had an "office" at a leased airport hangar where only two employees
worked).
19. In Melliere, the Appellate Court did not compare the employee headcounts at the
defendant's St. Clair County airport hangar and its Monroe County headquarters. The decision,
however, says the following: "Luhr Bros. is engaged in construction projects, such as
embankment work, channel maintenance, and other river projects, on the navigable waters of the
United States. It also engages in heavy construction projects and highway work on land." Id. at

Illinois Venue Reform

2012]

761

business that fit this pattern, the "any-fixed-place" interpretation allows
for suits against the entity in the county with the small place of
business. The convenience of the entity is not served, however, by
defending suits where it has only a relatively small place of business.
The convenience of the entity is served by defending suits where it has
its largest place or places of business. For example, in a suit arising
from an accident at a recycling yard in Vermillion County (Danville),
the recycling company had no yard in Cook County, but it had a
salesperson who worked out of an office in his home there. 2 0 The
company's convenience was not served by defending the suit in Cook
County instead of Vermillion County.
(3) The Group Convenience Problem. Venue is proper where any
defendant resides. 2 1 Even if every defendant but one resides in a
county, the "any-defendant" rule allows for suit in the remaining
defendant's county of residence. The convenience of other defendants
is

not

served,

however,

by

defending

the

suit

where

just

one

of

the

defendants resides. Indeed, the convenience of the defendants as a
group is served by defending the suit in the county with the greatest
number of defendants. For example, in a suit arising from surgery at a
hospital in McHenry County (Woodstock) by a McHenry County
surgeon who was part of a McHenry County surgical group, the
hospital's parent corporation also owned a behavioral health facility in
Cook County.22 The convenience of the three defendants was not
served by defending this suit in Cook County instead of in McHenry
County.23

(4) The Nonresident Worker Problem. Suits against nonresidents can
be filed in any county. 24 This "any-county" rule disregards the
convenience of nonresidents who work in Illinois. For example, a
Kentucky resident who commutes to a job in Massac County
(Metropolis) might have a car accident in Illinois. The convenience of
the Kentucky resident is served by defending the accident suit in
Massac County, not at the opposite end of Illinois in Cook County,
where venue is also proper.
41.
Logically, a corporation engaged in these large construction projects would have
substantially more than two employees at its headquarters.
20. Corral v. Mervis Indus., Inc., 839 N.E.2d 524, 526-27, 532 (111. 2005) (affirming, for lack
of a sufficient record, a ruling that the corporation "resided" in Cook County because of this oneemployee office).
21. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101 (2010).
22. Gundlach v. Lind, 820 N.E.2d 1, 5-6 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
23. See id. (holding that the Cook County Circuit Court abused its discretion by refusing to
transfer the suit to McHenry County).
24.

735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101.
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(5) The Partof the TransactionProblem. Transaction-based venue is
proper in any county where part of the transaction giving rise to the
cause of action occurred.2 5 Even if all of the witnesses are in a county
where part of the transaction occurred and none of the witnesses are in a
different county where another part of it occurred, the "any-part" rule
allows for suit in either county. The convenience of the witnesses is not
served, however, when proper venue rests in either county. Logically,
in this situation, the more convenient county to hear the suit is the
county with all of the witnesses. For example, in a suit based on a
doctor's improper supervision of care during an ambulance transfer
from Clinton County (Carlyle) to St. Louis, the negligence and injuries
occurred partly in an ambulance as it passed through St. Clair County
(Belleville).2 6 No person along the route could have witnessed the
negligence inside the ambulance. Instead, the witnesses to the
negligence were in Clinton County, where the transfer began and the
care was supervised. 27 Venue was proper in Clinton County and St.
Clair County, but hearing the suit in St. Clair County instead of Clinton
County did not serve the convenience of the witnesses. 28
(6) The Indirect Dealings Problem. Transaction-based venue,
according to some courts, must be based on dealings between the
parties. 29 Many manufacturers sell their products only through dealers
or retailers. If a manufacturer sells its product this way and is sued for
consumer fraud, the county where the consumer bought the product and
suffered the loss normally has the greatest number of witnesses to the
transaction. Yet, because the consumer and the manufacturer did not
deal with each other in this county, the "party-dealings" test prevents
the consumer from suing the manufacturer there. The convenience of
25. Id.
26. Wier ex rel. Wier v. Ketterer, 479 N.E.2d 416, 416-17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
27. The St. Louis witnesses could not be compelled to testify in Illinois. See 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/2-1101 (providing that the subpoena power extends to witnesses "in the State").
28. As explained later, the variation in witness location patterns from suit to suit makes it
impossible to design a venue statute that will solve this problem without creating witness
inconvenience problems in other suits. See infra text accompanying notes 308-10. The problem
can be solved only by using the intrastateforum non conveniens doctrine to serve the witnesses'
convenience. Id.
29. See, e.g., Rensing v. Merck & Co., Inc., 857 N.E.2d 702, 706 (111.App. Ct. 2006) (holding
venue not proper in the county where the plaintiff bought Vioxx because the defendant drug
manufacturer had no direct dealings with the plaintiff there); Boxdorfer v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,
790 N.E.2d 391, 398-99 (lll. App. Ct. 2003) (holding venue not proper in the county where the
plaintiffs bought their cars because the defendant car manufacturer had no direct dealings with the
plaintiffs there). But see Frey Corp. v. Gilldorn Mortg. Midwest, Inc., 475 N.E.2d 1100, 1103
(Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (stating that dealings with a third party are a proper basis for venue when
these dealings have a definite and direct bearing on the cause of action); Kenilworth Ins. Co. v.
McDougal, 313 N.E.2d 673, 675 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (same).
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the witnesses, however, is not served by preventing suit in the county
with the greatest number of witnesses; indeed, it is best served by
permitting suit there. For example, in a consumer fraud suit accusing a
Michigan car manufacturer of not disclosing a defect that caused paint
to delaminate from its cars after the warranty expired, the paint
delamination had occurred in Madison County on cars sold by Madison
County car dealers to Madison County residents. 30 Because the "partydealings" test indicated transaction-based venue was improper in
Madison County, the appellate court ordered a transfer to Sangamon
County where the manufacturer had its registered agent. 31 Hearing the
suit in Sangamon County instead of Madison County did not serve the
convenience of the witnesses.
When these six problems threaten the sensible administration of
justice, the intrastate forum non conveniens doctrine might apply.
Under this doctrine, a court may transfer a suit to another county where
venue is also proper. 3 2 To determine whether the doctrine applies, a
court weighs three private interest factors and three public interest
factors. 33 A court rarely disturbs the plaintiff's forum choice, however,
unless the forum is neither the plaintiff's residence nor the place of the
accident or injury. 34
Litigation of intrastate forum non conveniens transfer motions
consumes a lot of time and money. 35 One proposed way to reduce this
30. Boxdorfer, 790 N.E.2d at 393, 398-99.
31. Id. at 398-99.
32. Langenhorst v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 848 N.E.2d 927, 934 (111.2006). Because the doctrine
does not permit transfer to a county where venue is improper, it cannot solve the indirect dealings
problem. The venue amendment needed to solve this problem is discussed infra text
accompanying notes 292-98.
33. The private interest factors are: "(1) the convenience of the parties; (2) the relative ease of
access to sources of testimonial, documentary, and real evidence; and (3) all other practical
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive." Langenhorst, 848 N.E.2d
at 934 (internal quotations omitted). The public interest factors are: "(1) the interest in deciding
controversies locally; (2) the unfairness of imposing trial expense and the burden of jury duty on
residents of a forum that has little connection to the litigation; and (3) the administrative
difficulties presented by adding litigation to already congested court dockets." Id.
34. Id When the plaintiffs choice is neither the plaintiffs residence nor the place of the
accident or injury, the suit sometimes has been transferred, but not always. Compare Dawdy v.
Union Pacific R.R. Co., 797 N.E.2d 687, 696-701 (Ill. 2003) (directing transfer of the suit to the
county where the accident occurred), with Langenhorst, 848 N.E.2d at 937-41 (upholding the
refusal to transfer the suit to the county where the accident occurred).
35. First Am. Bank v. Guerine, 764 N.E.2d 54, 60, 64-66 (Ill. 2002); Jill E. Adams, Dawdy
and the Future of IntrastateForum Non Conveniens in Illinois, 92 ILL. B.J. 246, 253-54 (2004);
Gordon E. Maag, Forum Non Conveniens in Illinois: A HistoricalReview, CriticalAnalysis, and

ProposalFor Change, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 461, 517 (2001). Justice Maag notes that between 1982
and 1999, an average of 16.2 forum non conveniens decisions were published in Illinois each
year. Id. Parties can petition for interlocutory review of intrastateforum non conveniens rulings.
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expensive litigation is to prohibit transfers that involve less than a
required minimum distance, such as 100 or 200 miles. 36 That
minimum-distance solution is one-sided, however, because it curbs
forum shopping by defendants without curbing forum shopping by
plaintiffs. The right solution is to enact better venue rules-ones that
advance the statute's convenience purposes or reduce both sides' ability
to forum shop.
This Article makes the case for venue reform. Part I discusses the
current venue statute and how courts have interpreted it. Next, Part II
proposes a reform in which venue is aligned more closely with
convenience. These convenience-based proposals would narrow venue
when the current rules are too broad to serve the statute's convenience
purposes, and they would broaden venue when the current rules are too
narrow to serve these purposes. Finally, Part III proposes a reform in
which forum shopping is eliminated in higher-value personal injury
suits. The anti-forum shopping proposals would limit venue to the
county (or counties) with the most significant connection to the
occurrence and the parties.
I. OVERVIEW OF ILLINOIS VENUE LAW

Venue is the location where a suit may be heard.37 Personal
jurisdiction law determines whether the defendant is required to defend
the suit in Illinois; venue law identifies the specific Illinois counties
available to hear the suit. 38 In most suits, the general venue statute
identifies the counties where venue lies. 39 The general venue statute
ILL. S. CT. R. 306(a)(2). Thus, the fact that parties can petition for an interlocutory appeal
prolongs the litigation in the trial courts. See Guerine, 764 N.E.2d at 60 ("Obviously, one of the
purposes of the forum non conveniens doctrine-sensible and effective judicial administrationis not being served by this protracted interlocutory litigation over plaintiffs' forum choices.").
Obviously, the parties themselves do not only incur the costs, as the Illinois Supreme Court has
noted that its resources, and indeed the resources of the lower courts, are better applied elsewhere.
Id.
36. Maag, supra note 35, at 523-25.
37. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Mosele, 368 N.E.2d 88, 91 (111. 1977).
38. Id.at 91-92.
39. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101 (2010). Special venue provisions apply in actions against
public, municipal, governmental, or quasi-governmental corporations; actions involving real
estate; actions made local by statute; actions for libel against an owner, publisher, etc., of a
newspaper or magazine; and actions against insurance companies. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2103. Special venue provisions also apply in attachment proceedings, forcible entry and detainer
proceedings, and replevin actions. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-103, 9-106, 19-103. For further
discussion of special venue provisions, see Willis R. Tribler & Panos T. Topalis, Venue and
Forum Non Conveniens, H§5.13-5.18 & 5.21-5.32, in 1 ILLINOIS CIVIL PRACTICE: OPENING THE
CASE (IICLE 2009). Forum selection clauses determine venue in some suits. E.g., Aon Corp. v.
Utley, 863 N.E.2d 701, 707-08 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (enforcing a clause that required legal
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provides for two different types of venue: (a) residence-based venue,
and (b) transaction-based venue.
A. Residence-Based Venue
The Illinois rules for residence-based venue depend on whether the
suit is against (1) an individual, (2) a legal entity, (3) a legal
representative, (4) multiple defendants, or (5) nonresidents. For all
defendants, venue is based on residence at the time the suit is filed.40
1. Individual Defendant
The statute does not expressly define what constitutes an individual's
"residence," so courts have defined it by borrowing four rules from
domicile law. First, residence requires an individual's physical
presence in the venue plus "intent and permanency of abode."41
Second, an individual's intent is inferred primarily from an individual's
actions.4 2 Third, an individual can have only one residence at a time.
Fourth, a change of residence requires a physical move coupled with the
intent to make the new dwelling place a home.44
These rules equate "residence" with domicile. 4 5 An individual can
have multiple dwelling places at any one time, but only one domicile at
a time. 46 For some individuals, identifying this place of domicile-and,
thus, residence-is difficult. In one case, the defendant divided his time
between his sister's mobile home in one county and his girlfriend's
apartment in another county, paying rent in both places. 47 In another
proceedings to be brought in the Circuit Court of Cook County of the State of Illinois).
40. Long v. Gray, 714 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (Ill. App. Ct.1999), abrogatedon other grounds by
Corral v. Mervis Indust. Inc., 839 N.E.2d 524 (111.2005); Wilson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 519
N.E.2d 44, 47-48 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
41. Webb v. Morgan, 531 N.E.2d 36,41 (111. App. Ct. 1988).
42. Id. A court may also consider statements of intent. Long, 714 N.E.2d at 1044-46.
Among the actions considered in the two decisions cited in this footnote were the ownership of
real estate, the individual's job (temporary or long-term), and the designation of the address to
appear on the individual's driver's license.
43. Id. at 1044.
44. Webb, 531 N.E.2d at 41.
45. Some courts interpret "residence" in a venue statute to mean domicile, while other courts
interpret it to mean a dwelling place regardless of domicile. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 11 cmt. k (1971). Illinois courts follow the domicile interpretation. See Webb, 531
N.E.2d at 41-42 (citing Hatcher v. Anders, 453 N.E.2d 74, 77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (finding that
the term "resident" was synonymous with "domicile" unless its meaning was limited by express
definition or by the context of the act).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§§

11, 20 (1971).

47. See Long, 714 N.E.2d at 1045 (referring to the defendant's testimony that he stayed at his
sister's mobile home in Kankakee County, where he paid part of the rent for "a month maybe,"
then stayed at his girlfriend's apartment in Cook County, where he paid all the rent for "four, five
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case, the defendant moved to places where he found work without
developing strong ties to those places. 4 8 To determine the residence of
individuals like these, the court must weigh the evidence and make a
judgment call about where the individual's ties are greatest-thus,
finding intent to reside there indefinitely. 4 9
These judgment calls could be avoided-and venue would be better
aligned with the convenience of the defendant-if venue was instead
based on an individual's regular dwelling place. In the first example,
the individual had regular dwelling places in two counties: where his
sister's mobile home was located and where his girlfriend's apartment
was located.50 No matter where the court determined that the defendant
had his "residence," he could have conveniently defended suits in either
county. In the second example, the individual had his regular dwelling
place in the county where he currently lived. 51 Even if he had his
"residence" in the county where he formerly lived, he could have
defended suits more conveniently where he currently lived.
Residence-based venue also restricts venue more than would be
required to adequately protect the convenience of the defendant. Many
individuals live in one county and have half-time or full-time jobs in
another county. If an individual commutes three to five times per week
to another county, these regular commutes indicate the individual also
could conveniently defend suits there. If the Illinois legislature were to
amend the statute to base venue on both a defendant's regular dwelling
place and a defendant's regular work place, the plaintiff would still have
this choice of venue without infringing on the convenience of the
defendant.
2. Legal Entity Defendant
While the statute does not expressly define what constitutes the
"residence" of individuals, it does expressly define what constitutes the
"residence" of legal entities. 5 2 The statute has separate definitions for
(a) private corporations, (b) partnerships, and (c) unincorporated
associations.
weeks").
48. See Webb, 531 N.E.2d at 43 (describing the codefendant as "a transient who moved from
place to place searching for employment").
49. See Long, 714 N.E.2d at 1044-45 (reviewing the record to determine whether venue was
established outside of Cook County).
50. See id. (reasoning that the individual's place of residence was ambiguous because he
resided in two different locations).
51. Webb, 531 N.E.2d at 42.
52.

735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102 (2010).
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a. Private Corporations
In actions against private corporations, venue will be proper if the
corporation meets any of three requirements to establish residence. A
private corporation organized under Illinois law resides in any county
where it has: (1) a registered office; (2) an "other office"; or (3) is doing
business. 53 This same definition of residence applies to a foreign
corporation authorized to transact business in Illinois. 54 If a foreign
corporation is not authorized to transact business in Illinois, it is a
nonresident.s
(i) Registered Office or Other Office
The term "registered office" refers to a private corporation's
registration with the Illinois Secretary of State or other Illinois agency.
The various Illinois registration statutes permit use of an outside entity
as a registered agent, with the outside entity's place of business serving
as the corporation's registered office.56 Many corporations choose an
outside entity with expertise in processing legal papers to ensure that
these papers receive proper attention and do not get lost among routine
mail and other correspondence. 57 Because this office serves as a
registered office for venue purposes, this choice can unfortunately make
venue proper in a county where the corporation has no place of business
and cannot conveniently defend suits.5 8
The term "office," as noted before, means any fixed place where a
private corporation conducts its affairs. 59 This place does not have to be
the corporation's principal place of business, nor even one of its
53. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102(a). The statute also lumps railroad and bridge companies
into the residence definition for private corporations, and therefore, the same venue rules apply to
these types of entities. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. If a foreign corporation not authorized to transact business in Illinois is the only
defendant, or if all the other defendants also are nonresidents, venue is proper in any county. 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101.
56. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5.05(ay(b) (2010) (Business Corporation Act of 1983); 805
ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/105.05(a)(l)-(2) (General Not for Profit Corporation Act of 1986); 205

ILL. COMP. STAT. 645/9(a)-(b) (2010) (Foreign Banking Office Act).
57. ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS
LIABILITY COMPANIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 251 (7th ed. 2001).

AND

LIMITED

58. See Torres v. Walsh, 456 N.E.2d 601, 603-04 (111.1983) (upholding the Cook County
circuit court's authority to transfer a suit in which venue was proper because Humana of Illinois,
Inc., which owned the Springfield Community Hospital, had designated C.T. Corporation System
as registered agent and C.T. Corporation System had its office in Cook County).
59. See Melliere v. Luhr Bros., Inc., 706 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) ("We ... hold that
the phrase other office as used in our venue statute means a fixed place of business at which the

affairs of the corporation are conducted in furtherance of a corporate activity.").
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relatively large places of business. 60 If all of the corporation's
executives and most of its employees work at a single large place of
business located in one particular county, residence there does not
preclude it from also residing in a county where the corporation
maintains a small place of business with no executives and only one or
two employees. 6 1 Thus, the corporation may be forced to defend an
action in a location where it will be much less convenient to litigate than
where it primarily conducts its business activities. By disregarding the
relative size of a private corporation's places of business, Illinois
protects the convenience of a private corporation far less than it protects
the convenience of a governmental corporation. In suits against
governmental corporations, a special venue statute limits residencebased venue to the county where the governmental corporation has its
"principal office." 62 The term "principal office" is interpreted to mean
the governmental corporation's nerve center-i.e., where its top
executives work.63 For example, in a suit against the Illinois
Department of Revenue, the Department had fifty employees who
worked at its DuPage County (Wheaton) regional office. 64 DuPage
County was not a proper venue, however, because the Department's top
executives worked at its larger offices in Springfield and Chicago. 65

60. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102(a) (treating the location of an "other office" as a
corporate residence without regard to that office's size relative to other offices of the
corporation).
61. See Corral v. Mervis Indus., Inc., 839 N.E.2d 524, 526-27 (Ill. 2005) (affirming, for lack
of a sufficient record to permit appellate review, a ruling that venue was established by a oneemployee office in that employee's home); Melliere, 706 N.E.2d at 43-44 (finding a leased
airport hangar where just two employees worked to be an "office").
62.

735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-103(a).

63. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc. v. Dep't of Rev., 823 N.E.2d 625, 632 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005),
abrogatedon other grounds by Corral v. Mervis Indus., 839 N.E.2d 524 (Ill. 2005). The United
States Supreme Court recently adopted the "nerve center" test as the proper test to identify, for
diversity of citizenship purposes, the state where a corporation has its principal place of business.
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192 (2010). The Supreme Court defined the nerve center
as the location where "a corporation's officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's
activities." Id. The corporation's headquarters is normally the nerve center, "provided that the
headquarters is the actual center of direction, control, and coordination . . . and not simply an
office where the corporation holds its board meetings." Id.
64. Home Depot, 823 N.E.2d at 633-34.
65. Id. at 634. The Appellate Court said that governmental entities other than municipalities
can have more than one "principal office." Id. at 631. However, the United States Supreme
Court has said that statutory language referring a corporation's principal "place" of business
should be interpreted to refer to a single place. Hertz Corp., 130 S. Ct. at 1192. If the Illinois
Supreme Court ultimately interprets the similar language in the special venue statute to refer to a
single place, Illinois courts will have to decide whether a state agency's nerve center is at its
Springfield office or its Chicago office based, perhaps, on how much time the agency's top
executives spend at each office.
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(ii) DoingBusiness

A corporation is also deemed a resident of a county for venue
purposes if it is "doing business" there. 6 6 The term "doing business"
refers to the conduct of a private corporation's "usual and customary
business." 67 The statute does not specify how often the corporation
must conduct this business in the county to satisfy this requirement.
Courts have held, however, that infrequent conduct is insufficient.6 8
A private corporation's usual and customary business is its core
business. For example, a corporation in the legal services business is
"doing business" in a county where it often performs legal services. 69
Similarly, a corporation in the trucking business is "doing business" in a
county where it often picks up and delivers freight.7 0
A private corporation's usual and customary business, however, does
not include activities that are only incidental to its core business. For
this reason, a corporation is generally not doing business in counties
where it only: (1) solicits business,71 (2) makes purchases, 72 or (3)
supports sales of its products by independent dealers. 73 For this reason,

66. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102(a).

67. Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Mosele, 368 N.E.2d 88, 92 (Ill. 1977).
68. See id. (holding that infrequent train movements across county lines during "yarding" of
trains in an adjacent county were insufficient to establish that the defendant was doing business in
the proposed venue county); see also Stambaugh v. Int'l Harvester Co., 464 N.E.2d 1011, 101415 (Ill. 1984) (holding that sales-support visits to independent dealers were similar to the regular,
but infrequent, activities that did not constitute "doing business" in Mosele).
69. See McLane v. Russell, 512 N.E.2d 366, 370 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that a
professional corporation was "doing business" in Peoria County by representing creditors in
bankruptcy proceedings that involved eight proofs of claim filed in the federal bankruptcy court
in Peoria).
70. See Long v. Gray, 714 N.E.2d 1041, 1046-47 (111.App. Ct. 1999), abrogatedon other
grounds by Corral v. Mervis Indus., 839 N.E.2d 524 (Ill. 2005) (holding that a trucking company
was "doing business" in Cook County by making six freight deliveries and thirteen freight
pickups in Cook County in the month the suit was filed).
71. See Mosele, 368 N.E.2d at 93-94 (holding that solicitation of freight traffic, which
occurred both in person and by telephone within Madison County, did not constitute "doing
business" there because the railroad received the freight outside Madison County).
72. See Hartung v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 443 N.E.2d 16, 17-19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)
(holding that an electric company was not "doing business" in a county where it had entered into
contracts with residents to purchase supplies and materials).
73. See Stambaugh, 464 N.E.2d at 1014-17 (holding that an equipment manufacturer was not
"doing business" in a county where: (i) it did not design, manufacture, directly advertise, directly
finance, or directly sell its products to consumers; and (ii) the independent dealer sales were a tiny
percentage of the defendant's annual sales). Acts incidental to independent dealer sales, such as
mailing rebate checks and paying for warranty work, also do not meet the "doing business"
requirement. See, e.g., Boxdorfer v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 790 N.E.2d 391, 396-97 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2003) (paying for warranty work); Gardner v. Int'l Harvester Co., 499 N.E.2d 430, 432-33
(Ill. 1986) (mailing rebate checks).
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too, a corporation is not automatically doing business where its
subsidiary corporation is doing business. 7 4
Once again, Illinois protects a private corporation's convenience less
For
than it protects a governmental corporation's convenience.
example, the Illinois Department of Revenue ("IDR") likely conducts
its usual and customary business on a regular basis in every Illinois
county.75 Yet, in suits against governmental corporations like the IDR,
venue cannot be based on doing business, and thus residence-based
venue is limited to where the IDR has its principal office. 76
In addition to this inequality problem, lack of clarity about the
meaning of "doing business" has led to wasteful litigation. For
example, in a suit based on injuries suffered by a farmer during a tractor
fire in Brown County (Mt. Sterling), the tractor manufacturer had its
headquarters in one county and its manufacturing plants in six other
counties.7 7 It had no place of business in St. Clair County, but it
supported sales by St. Clair County farm equipment dealers by sending
employees to visit the dealers to assist with product marketing, and by
partially reimbursing the dealers for the cost of advertising that included
the manufacturer's logo.78 When the suit was filed, no controlling
precedent determined whether this kind of sales-support activity
qualified as "doing business" within the meaning of the statute.79 The
farmer's attorney filed the suit in St. Clair County, the circuit court
overruled a venue objection, and the jury returned a large verdict.80
However, on appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held for the tractor
manufacturer on the "doing business" issue and remanded with

74. See Stambaugh, 464 N.E.2d at 1015 (holding that an equipment manufacturer was not
"doing business" where its wholly-owned financing company subsidiary financed equipment
sales by independent dealers).
75. The Department's self-described responsibilities are to: (1) "serve as the tax collection
agency for state government and for local governments"; (2) administer the state's lottery; (3)
regulate the manufacture, sale, and distribution of alcoholic beverages; (4) oversee local property
assessments; and (5) serve as funding agent for the Illinois Housing Development Authority. Our
Responsibilities, ILL. DEP'T OF REVENUE, http://www.revenue.state.il.us/AboutIdor (last visited

Apr. 19, 2012). Logically, the Department carries on these activities in all Illinois counties.
76. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-103(a) (2010).
77. Stambaugh, 464 N.E.2d at 1016.
78. Id. at 1013-15.
79. See id at 1013 (noting that the Illinois Supreme Court had not construed the term "doing
business" before the Mosele decision).
80. Id. at 1011-13. The jury's verdict awarded the plaintiff $650,000 in compensatory
damages and $15 million in punitive damages. Id. at 1011. The trial court ordered a remitter
reducing the punitive damages to $7.5 million, which the appellate court further reduced to
$650,000. Id.
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directions to transfer the suit for retrial in a proper venue. 81 As a result,
the St. Clair County trial and subsequent appeals-including the time
and expenses invested by the parties-were essentially wasted.8 2
b. Partnerships
A partnership sued in its firm name resides in any county where a
partner resides, where the partnership has an office, or where it is doing
business. 83 If all partners are nonresidents, the partnership has no
Illinois office, and it is not doing business in Illinois, the partnership is a
nonresident. 84 These residence and nonresident definitions also apply
to joint ventures, which essentially are partnerships formed for a
specific enterprise or transaction.85
The terms "office" and "doing business" have the same meanings for
partnerships as for private corporations. 86 Yet, partnership residence
based on individual partner residence has no counterpart in corporate
residence. For example, in many general partnerships, the partners are
akin to corporate officers, but corporate residence is not based on officer
residence. Likewise, in many limited partnerships, the limited partners
are akin to shareholders, but corporate residence is not based on
shareholder residence. Whether the organizers of a business form a
general partnership, limited partnership, or private corporation hinges
on their preferences about liability, taxation, and registration fees. The
venue in which an organization can be sued and the effect that this has
on the convenience of litigating there are not considerations that
typically influence the selection of a business organization form.
Accordingly, the statute should not have different residence rules for
partnerships and private corporations.
Venue based on partner residence can force a partnership to defend
suits in inconvenient places. For example, in a personal injury suit
81. Stambaugh,464 N.E.2d at 1016-17.
82. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing the outcome of the trial in St. Clair
County). Not only was the trial wasted, but also both plaintiff and defendant incurred
considerable expense to address the issue of the excessive punitive damages award.
83. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102(b) (2010).
84. Id. If the partnership is the only defendant, or if the other defendants also are
nonresidents, the suit can be filed in any county. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101.
85. See Wilson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 519 N.E.2d 44, 48-49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(examining whether any of the corporations that participated in the defendant joint venture were
"doing business" in Madison County at the time the suit was filed and concluding that none of
them were).
86. See Turner v. Jarden, 656 N.E.2d 1125, 1127 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that a dairy
partnership was "doing business" in Madison County by raising feed for its cows on about 150
acres in Madison County, even though its acreage and buildings were located primarily in an
adjoining county).

772

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 43

based on an accident at an office building in Lake County (Waukegan),
the defendant might be a limited partnership organized to own the
building on behalf of investors. If a limited partner investor resides in
Madison County (Edwardsville), the partnership's convenience is not
served by defending a suit in Madison County instead of Lake
County.
c. Unincorporated Associations
A voluntary unincorporated association sued in its own name resides
in any county where it has an office; or, if no Illinois office can be
found on due inquiry, it resides where any officer resides." If all
members are nonresidents, the association has no Illinois office, and it is
not doing business in Illinois, then the association is a nonresident.89
Because limited liability companies are neither corporations nor
partnerships, 90 the residence and nonresident rules that apply to
unincorporated associations also, by process of elimination, seem likely
to apply to limited liability companies. However, it is undecided in
Illinois which venue rules apply to limited liability companies, and in
one state, a limited liability company that has been treated as a
partnership for tax purposes is also treated as a partnership for venue
purposes. 9 ' If the Illinois venue rules for unincorporated associations
apply, a limited liability company resides where it has an office; or, if
87. No Illinois decision considers whether the term "partner" in the Illinois venue statute
refers to all partners (including limited partners) or to only general partners. Decisions by other
state courts conflict, though one Georgia Supreme Court decision that limited the term "partner"
to general partners interpreted a state constitutional provision rather than a venue statute. See
Maupin v. Meadow Park Manor, 125 P.3d 611, 613-14 (Mont. 2005) (interpreting the partnership
provision of the Montana venue statute to apply to limited partnerships and holding venue was
proper in a slip-and-fall suit brought in Cascade County against the limited partnership that
owned the Richland County apartment building where the accident occurred because one of the
limited partners, who did not participate in managing the business, resided in Cascade County).
But see Nolan Road West, Ltd. v. PNC Realty Holding Corp. of Ga., 559 S.E.2d 447, 449-50
(Ga. 2002) (interpreting a provision in the Georgia Constitution about venue in suits against
copartners residing in different counties not to apply to a limited partner).
88.

735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102(c).

8 9. Id
90. See Limited Liability Company Act, 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180 (2010) (setting forth the
statutes that govern LLCs, which differ from the statutes that govern private corporations and the
statutes that govern partnerships); Scott R. Anderson, The Illinois Limited Liability Company: A

Flexible Alternative ForBusiness, 25 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 55, 86-105 (1993) (comparing LLCs with
other Illinois business entities).
91. Ex parte Miller, Hamilton, Snider & Odom, LLC, 942 So. 2d 334, 336-37 (Ala. 2006)
(noting that limited liability companies are not mentioned in the Alabama venue statutes, and
holding that venue in a suit against a law firm organized as an LLC, which had been treated for
many years as a partnership for tax purposes, should also be determined under the Alabama venue
rule for partnerships, not the rule for corporations, nor the rule for unincorporated associations).
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no Illinois office can be found on due inquiry, it resides where any
officer resides. If all of its members are nonresidents, it has no Illinois
office, and it is not doing business in Illinois, the limited liability
company is a nonresident.
The choice between forming a limited liability company and forming
a private corporation hinges primarily on preferences about taxation. 92
Much like the partnership discussed above, venue and its effect on
litigation convenience are not considerations that go into the decision to
run a business as a limited liability company. The Illinois venue statute
should not have different residence rules for limited liability companies,
partnerships, and private corporations.
The definitions themselves invite confusion. A limited liability
company has no officers; it has managers and members. 93 Also, the
term "member" has a technical meaning in the limited liability company
context. 94
These definitions could also create a small venue gap. For example,
a trucking company that is based in Indiana and organized as an Indiana
limited liability company might regularly pick up and deliver freight in
White County (Carmi), Illinois, despite having no place of business in
Illinois. Suppose its truck hits a White County resident's car just across
the border in Indiana, and the car owner tries to sue in Illinois.
Residence-based venue is unavailable, because the trucking company
has no Illinois office, it likely has no "officer" who resides in Illinois,
and the company cannot be a nonresident when it is doing business in
Illinois.95 Transaction-based venue is also unavailable because the suit
is based on a transaction (the accident) that took place outside of
Illinois. The Illinois courts might have personal jurisdiction over the
trucking company under the Illinois long-arm statute; 96 but, due to lack
of venue, the suit could not be filed in any county.
92. See Anderson, supra note 90, at 56-57 (noting tax benefits and other benefits associated
with LLCs).
93. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/13-5 (2010) (establishing agency rules for members and
managers); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/45-5(a)(7) (requiring a statement as to whether an LLC is
member-managed or manager-managed).
94. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/13-5. Similar issues would arise if an LLC were deemed a
partnership for venue purposes. Which persons would then count as "partners" whose residence
would make venue proper in a suit against the LLC? For example, would a member who is not a
manager count as a "partner"?
95. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102(c) (2010) (specifying what makes an unincorporated
association a nonresident). This potential venue gap would be a strong reason not to treat an LLC
as an unincorporated association for venue purposes.
96. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-209(b)(4), (c) (granting Illinois courts the power to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a person or entity doing business in Illinois and to the extent allowable
under the Illinois Constitution and the Constitution of the United States); Williams v. Lawson &
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3. Legal Representative Defendant
Unlike the ordinary individuals or business entities to which the
previously-described rules apply, certain individuals must be sued
through a legal representative. Neither a deceased individual nor the
deceased individual's estate has the legal capacity to be sued-the
proper party to name as the defendant is the executor or the
administrator. 97 A minor or a legally disabled individual similarly lacks
legal capacity-the proper party to name as the defendant is a guardian,
In suits against legal
guardian ad litem, or next friend.98
representatives, venue depends on the legal representative's residence,
not the represented individual's residence. 99 In other words, if the legal
representative is an individual, the residence rules for individuals are
applied to that individual; if the legal representative is a legal entity, the
residence rules for legal entities are applied to that legal entity.
This use of the legal representative's residence invites manipulation.
During the many years when the legal representative's citizenship
determined whether the federal courts had diversity jurisdiction,
attorneys chose legal representatives specifically for their effect on
Lawson Towing Co., 510 N.E.2d 1308, 1311 (111. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that a towing company
was subject to personal jurisdiction under the "doing business" doctrine because it regularly
provided towing services on the Mississippi River in Illinois). If a state has a valid basis for
general jurisdiction over a defendant, it can exercise jurisdiction in a suit that is unrelated to the
defendant's connection with the state. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.
Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). The U.S. Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that a state may base general
jurisdiction on "systematic and continuous general business contacts." Id. at 2857 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court further described these contacts as ones that mean
a corporate defendant is "fairly regarded as at home." Id at 2854. It listed incorporating in a
state, or locating the corporation's principal place of business in a state, as paradigm bases for the
exercise of general jurisdiction. Id. at 2854 (citing Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at
GeneralJurisdiction,66 TEx. L. REV. 721, 733 (1988)). The cited law review article argues that
a state also should be able to exercise general jurisdiction when a corporate defendant's activity
"reaches the quantum of local activity in which a purely local company typically would engage."
Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at GeneralJurisdiction,66 TEx. L. REv. 721, 742 (1988).
An Indiana-based trucking company that regularly picks up and delivers freight in Illinois
arguably has reached the quantum of local activity in which an Illinois-based trucking company
would engage. The opposing argument is, of course, that the Illinois-based trucking company
engages in qualitatively greater local activity as a result of having a local place of business.
97. See Marcus v. Art Nissen & Son, Inc., 586 N.E.2d 694, 696-97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) ("[A]
lawsuit must have a plaintiff and a defendant and .. . both must be in existence for the lawsuit to
proceed."(dictum)); Wisemantle v. Hull Enters., Inc., 432 N.E.2d 613, 616 (111. App. Ct. 1981)
("[A]n action against an estate must be brought against an administrator or executor as the
representative of the estate.").
98. See 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-13(d) (outlining the capacity of a guardian of a minor to
sue or be sued on the minors behalf); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 la-18(c) (outlining the same, but
in the context of a disabled adult).
99. See Precision Components, Inc. v. Estate of Kuntz, 445 N.E.2d 449, 450 (Ill. App. Ct.
1983) (noting venue is proper where the executor resides).
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jurisdiction, and not for their experience or skill in representing
Congress stopped this
individuals lacking legal capacity.100
manipulation by making diversity jurisdiction depend instead on the
citizenship of the deceased person, minor, or incompetent.' 0 ' Illinois
does not have a similar history of attorneys choosing legal
representatives for their effect on residence-based venue, but given the
opportunity to divert litigation to a preferred venue, similar incentives
exist. Accordingly, Illinois should prevent this type of manipulation
before it starts.
4. Multiple Defendants
In suits against multiple defendants, venue is proper where any
defendant resides. 102 The defendant that the plaintiff uses to fix venue
must be "joined in good faith and with probable cause for the purpose of
obtaining a judgment against him or her and not solely for the purpose
of fixing venue in that county." 10 3 This good faith requirement is
designed to prevent the "subterfuge" of pretending to seek a judgment
against a resident defendant who has been joined just to fix venue in a
suit really aimed at securing a judgment against a nonresident
defendant. 104
Making a determination of whether or not the plaintiff has complied
with the statute's anti-venue fixing requirement demands the application
of several key terms of art. "Good faith," in the context of the statute,
means an honest intention to abstain from unconscientiously taking
100. See Linda S. Mullenix, Creative Manipulation of Federal Jurisdiction: Is There Diversity

After Death?, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 1011, 1026 (1985) (noting that some litigants have admitted
that they intentionally appointed a representative for the purposes of securing federal
jurisdiction). Not surprisingly, courts have acknowledged the difficulty in determining the
subjective intentions of appointing a representative for the purposes of securing jurisdiction.
Pallazola v. Rucker, 797 F.2d 1116, 1121 (1st Cir. 1986). As a result, various commentators had
proposed the adoption of per se rules that would govern the citizenship of the parties, ranging
from the domicile of the decedent to the domicile of the beneficiaries. Id. Eventually, Congress
settled on the domicile of the represented decedent. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2) (2006). This change was adopted as a part of the 1988
amendments to section 1332. See David Siegel, Commentary on 1988 Revision, in 28 U.S.C. §
1291-1329 at 382 (2006).
102. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101.
103. Id.
104. See Green v. Unity Container Corp., 129 N.E.2d 458, 462 (Ill. App. Ct. 1955) ("The
purpose .. . is to prevent a plaintiff from joining a resident in the county with a nonresident as a
mere subterfuge for the purpose of obtaining a judgment against the nonresident."). In this sense,
the concept is much like that of fraudulent joinder used to defeat diversity jurisdiction in federal
court between otherwise diverse parties. See, e.g., Poulos v. Naas Foods, Inc., 959 F.2d 69, 73
(7th Cir. 1992) (explaining federal law designed to prevent or remedy fraudulent joinder in
diversity cases).
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advantage of another. 105 "Probable cause" means a reasonable belief
the claim is valid. 106 "Solely for the purpose" means fixing venue must
not be the only reason for joining the defendant, though it may be the
primary reason. 1 07
Under these definitions, the plaintiff can meet the good faith
requirement despite circumstances strongly suggesting that the joinder
was motivated by forum shopping. For example, in a personal injury
suit the plaintiff alleged a defendant manufacturer's drug caused a
hemorrhage that other defendants then negligently treated.' 08 After
using the manufacturer's residence to fix venue, the plaintiff waited
sixteen months to pursue the bad drug claim, after which the plaintiffs
own experts testified the drug played no role in the hemorrhage and the
plaintiff did not oppose the manufacturer's summary judgment
motion. 109 Nevertheless, the court deemed the joinder in good faith and
approved the plaintiffs use of the manufacturer's residence to fix
venue.1 10
Bad faith occasionally has been found. For example, in a loan
collection suit, the plaintiff lenders sued the guarantors of a note and the
note's maker after the lenders already had received a distribution on
105. Green, 129 N.E.2d at 462.
106. Id.
107. Suttle ex rel. Suttle v. Lake Forest Hosp., 660 N.E.2d 214, 218 (1ll. App. Ct. 1995). The
decision indicates that meeting the probable cause requirement establishes that a defendant was
not joined solely for the purpose of fixing venue. Id. This interpretation makes the proper
purpose requirement redundant.
108. Decker v. St. Mary's Hosp., 619 N.E.2d 537, 540 (lll. App. Ct. 1993).
109. Id. at 543.
110. Id. Specifically, the court determined that the manufacturer was not added in bad faith
because it was not clear until the depositions of the plaintiff's own experts that the manufacturer's
drug could not have caused the alleged injury. Accord Novak v. Thies, 412 N.E.2d 666, 668 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1980) (holding that the plaintiffs failure to produce evidence at trial against the
defendant joined to fix venue did not establish bad faith, because a flexible trial strategy might
have led the plaintiff's attorney to forego introduction of evidence against that defendant). Query
whether a plaintiff, by turning a blind eye to evidence that would preclude a claim against a
defendant joined to fix venue, or by making little effort to investigate this claim, could ensure that
the court could not find bad faith joinder. These actions likely would violate the duty to perform
a reasonable investigation before pleading a claim, ILL. SUP. CT. R. 137, but the plaintiff might
calculate that the odds of sanctions are low enough that the risk is worth taking to pursue a
favorable venue. The Illinois Supreme Court dealt with a joinder ploy similar to the ploy in
Decker in a case where the plaintiff, facing a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non
conveniens, joined two Illinois residents as additional defendants to justify keeping the suit in
Illinois. See Adkins v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 301 N.E.2d 729, 731 (111.1973) ("It
seems apparent that the individual defendants were joined in order to make the Illinois action look
different from the Iowa action, and thereby provide some sort of basis upon which the denial of
the motion to dismiss could be predicated."). Despite making this statement, the Illinois Supreme
Court did not suggest that the plaintiff should be sanctioned. Id.
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their claim against the maker in the maker's bankruptcy proceedings.' 1 '
Because the claim against the maker could not survive those bankruptcy
proceedings, the court deemed the joinder in bad faith and disapproved
the plaintiffs' use of the maker's residence to fix venue. 112
If the claim against the defendant that the plaintiff uses to fix venue is
later dismissed, the dismissal's effect on venue depends on the type of
dismissal. Following a voluntary dismissal, a remaining defendant can
move for transfer as though the dismissed defendant had not been a
party. 1 3 If dismissal is involuntary, however, a defendant cannot move
for transfer under this voluntary dismissal rule.
The voluntary dismissal rule can discourage settlement with the
defendant used to fix venue. Ordinarily, if discovery indicates that the
claim against this defendant is weak, the plaintiff would prefer to settle
the claim by voluntarily dismissing it in exchange for a small payment.
Or, if discovery indicates the claim against this defendant is strong, the
plaintiff would prefer to settle the claim by voluntarily dismissing it in
exchange for a large payment. Yet, because of the venue consideration,
the plaintiff might continue to litigate the claim in order to preserve the
right to litigate claims against other defendants in the plaintiffs
preferred county.
5. Nonresident Defendants
An action may be commenced in any county if all defendants are
nonresidents.11 4 The rationale for this any-county rule is that all
counties are about equally inconvenient for most nonresidents. 5 This
equal-inconvenience rationale is false, however, for the tens of
thousands of individuals who live in adjacent states and work in Illinois.
111. Green v. Unity Container Corp., 129 N.E.2d 458, 462 (Ill. App. Ct. 1955).
112. Id.; see also Gass v. Anna Hosp. Corp., 911 N.E.2d 1084, 1089-93 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)
(holding that in a suit based on a subsidiary corporation's acts, the plaintiff cannot join the parent
corporation and use its residence to fix venue without alleging facts that meet the legal
requirements for piercing the corporate veil).
113. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-104(b) (2010).
114. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101.
115. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 652 (1992) ("[F]or most nonresident
defendants the inconvenience will be great whether they have to defend in, say, Billings [county]
or Havre [county]."). This concept is also often applied in the case where a nonresident plaintiff
has chosen a particular venue. Because the plaintiff is a nonresident, the convenience of one
county within the state over another is mitigated, and as a result, the plaintiff's choice of forum is
given less deference. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 (1981) (applying this
concept in the international context); Dawdy v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 797 N.E.2d 687, 694 (Ill.
2003) (applying this concept in. the intrastate context). The Indiana Supreme Court spelled out
the same principle in the context of a nonresident defendant in Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Ford
Motor Co., 857 N.E.2d 971, 977 (Ind. 2006).
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For these nonresidents, a distant county on the opposite side of Illinois
is a far less convenient place to defend suits than the county where they
regularly work. 116
B. Transaction-BasedVenue

The general venue statute provides for transaction-based venue in any
county where part of the transaction occurred out of which the cause of
action arose.1 17 Under a broad interpretation of this form of venue, any
matter the plaintiff has the burden of proving can be used to establish
venue. 118 Under a narrow interpretation, dealings between the parties
must be used to establish venue. 119 Because the Illinois Supreme Court
has not identified which of these interpretations reflects the Illinois
General Assembly's intent, there is some uncertainty about the proper
venue for (1) contract claims, and (2) tort claims. 120
1. Contract Claims
In breach of contract suits, the burden-of-proof test applied under the
broad interpretation of transaction-based venue permits venue to be
based on (i) negotiations,12 1 (ii) signing,1 22 (iii) an event that triggers a
116. The equal-inconvenience rationale nevertheless has enough truth for this type of venue
provision to pass muster under the U.S. Constitution. See Burlington N R.R. Co., 504 U.S. at 653
("Montana could thus have decided that a nonresident defendant's interest in convenience is too
slight to outweigh the plaintiffs interest in suing in the forum of his choice."). Regardless, states
have the right to create alternative methods of choosing venue for nonresident defendants and,
indeed, "to give so much weight to the interests of plaintiffs as to allow them to sue in the
counties of their choice under all circumstances." Id. at 651-52.
117. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101.
118. See Williams v. Ill. State Scholarship Comm'n, 563 N.E.2d 465, 485 (lll. 1990)
(referring to the test for venue, where the plaintiff has the burden of proving the place where the
transaction occurred).
119. See id. (defining the place where a "transaction or some part" occurred for purposes of
the test for venue).
120. A few venue decisions have involved other types of claims. See S. & Cent. Ill. Laborers'
Dist. Council v. Ill. Health Facilities Planning Bd., 772 N.E.2d 980, 984-85 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)
(governmental duty claim applying 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-103(a)), abrogated by Corral v.
Mervis Indus., Inc., 839 N.E.2d 524, 526 (Ill. 2005); Patel v. Lacey, 561 N.E.2d 455, 457-58 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990) (fiduciary duty claim).
121. See Christopher v. West, 104 N.E.2d 309, 315 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952) (finding that venue
was proper in the county where the parties engaged in conferences, negotiations, and other
dealings).
122. See Servicemaster Co. v. Mary Thompson Hosp., 532 N.E.2d 1009, 1012-15 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1988) (concluding that venue was proper in the county where plaintiff signed the contract,
even though plaintiff delivered the signed contract to the defendant in another county where the
defendant affixed its signature) (alternative holding); see also Doe v. Supreme Lodge of the Loyal
Order of Moose, 619 N.E.2d 194, 197 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that venue was proper in the
county where the contract was signed by plaintiffs guardian, even though the services were
provided in another county); Curt Bullock Builders, Inc. v. H.S.S. Dev., Inc., 586 N.E.2d 1284,

2012]1

Illinois Venue Reform

779

contractual duty, 123 (iv) performance,124 (v) an expected effect of
performance,125 or (vi) breach.12 6 These six bases make it possible to
sue in virtually any county with witnesses to a matter important to a
contract claim. 127 The broad interpretation, in other words, ensures that
Yet, this
venue can serve the convenience of the witnesses.
interpretation does not ensure venue will serve the convenience of the
witnesses. In choosing among the counties where venue is proper,
plaintiffs typically look for the county with the most favorable juries
and judges, the most current docket, or the location most convenient for
the plaintiff.128 With six bases to use, plaintiffs have relatively wide
latitude to advance their own interests instead of the convenience of the
witnesses.
The party-dealings test applied under the narrow interpretation of
transaction-based venue gives plaintiffs less latitude, but its effect on
the convenience of the witnesses varies from case to case. If a case
hinges on events in a county where the parties dealt with each other, this
narrow interpretation likely has a positive effect on the convenience of
the witnesses. On the other hand, if a case hinges on events in a county
where the parties did not deal with each other, this narrow interpretation
likely has a negative effect.
Whether positive or negative, these effects on the convenience of the
witnesses might be only coincidental. The narrow interpretation,
1292 (111.App. Ct. 1992) (asserting that venue was proper in the county where plaintiff signed the
lease agreement, even though the leased premises were in another county).
123. See Kenilworth Ins. Co. v. McDougal, 313 N.E.2d 673, 675 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (finding
that venue was proper in the county where the accident, which allegedly triggered uninsured
motorist coverage, occurred).
124. See Servicemaster Co., 532 N.E.2d at 1013-15 (concluding that venue was proper in the
county where the management services contract was performed in substantial part by plaintiff and
where defendant initially delivered its payments, even though the management services were for a
hospital in another county) (alternative holding).
125. See Frey Corp. v. Gilldorn Mortg. Midwest, Inc., 475 N.E.2d 1100, 1102-04 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1985) (finding that venue was proper in the county where an apartment project was to be
built, even though the defendant mortgage banker's efforts to secure extensions of the U.S.
government's firm commitment to this project were supposed to occur elsewhere).
126. See Hanna v. Breese Trenton Mining Co., 449 N.E.2d 226, 228-29 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)
(asserting that venue was proper in the county where the corporation breached its contractual duty
by not paying declared dividends to a shareholder who resided in the county).
127. Venue cannot be based on insignificant details that have no importance to the cause of
action. See, e.g., Winn v. Vogel, 103 N.E.2d 673, 676 (111.App. Ct. 1952) (holding that venue
was not proper in a county where a party merely deposited a check in its bank account after
receiving the check in a different county).
128. See Maag, supra note 35, at 510-12 (commenting on the parties' efforts to obtain a
favorable jury and judge). In certain types of cases, such as cases involving a terminal disease
like mesothelioma, the plaintiff s need for a prompt trial date can make it very important to file in
a venue with the capacity to handle complex litigation expeditiously.
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according to at least one court, protects the defendant. The defendantprotection policy is most clearly stated in American Oil Co. v.
Mason.12 9 This decision concerned a venue objection in a loan
collection suit filed by an oil company against a gasoline station
operator and his sureties. In Ogle County (Oregon), the station operator
and his sureties, who resided in DeKalb County (Sycamore), signed and
delivered to the oil company's representative a dealership installment
note and other loan documents. 1 30 In Cook County, which is about 100
miles east of Ogle County, the oil company received the note, approved
the loan, and received the loan payments. 13 1
Under the broad interpretation's burden-of-proof test, venue would
have been proper in Cook County. In order to establish venue, the oil
company would have had to show only that parts of the contract
formation and breach-on which it had the burden of proof as elements
of the contract action-had occurred in Cook County.132 Given the fact
that the broad interpretation is the result of a policy to promote the
convenience of the witnesses, such a policy would have been served just
as well by hearing the suit in Cook County as in Ogle County. Cook
County was the location convenient for the oil company personnel who
knew about the loan, the payment record, and the default; Ogle County
was the location convenient for the persons with this knowledge about
the station operator's side of the transaction.
Nevertheless, the Mason court held that transaction-based venue was
proper only in Ogle County-that is, Cook County was not a proper
venue for the suit. 13 3 Invoking the "party-dealings test" applied in the
narrow interpretation of transaction-based venue, the Mason court said
this form of venue requires "dealings between the parties themselves
while the[y] are in some sense adversaries," not "incidental or
preliminary" dealings between the parties, nor dealings "with third
persons."' 34 This test, the Mason court explained, honors the Illinois
129. Am. Oil Co. v. Mason, 273 N.E.2d 17, 18 (111. App. Ct. 1971) (citing Heldt v. Watts, 69
N.E.2d 97 (lll. App. Ct. 1946)).
130. Id. at 17-18.
131. Id at 18.
132. See Servicemaster Co. v. Mary Thompson Hosp., 532 N.E.2d 1009, 1012-15 (Il. App.
Ct. 1988) (holding that venue was proper where one party signed the contract even though it was
delivered to and signed by the other party in another county); Hanna v. Breese Trenton Mining
Co., 449 N.E.2d 226, 228-29 (111.App. Ct. 1983) (finding that venue was proper where the
corporation breached its contract by not paying declared dividends).
133. Mason, 273 N.E.2d at 18. Venue was also proper in DeKalb County based on the
defendants' residence. Id.
134. Id (quoting La Ham v. Sterling Canning Co., 52 N.E.2d 467, 472 (Ill. App. Ct. 1943))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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General Assembly's intent "to insulate defendants from being sued in a
faraway place where he neither resides nor carries on any kind of
activities."1 35 The Mason court then ruled that the oil company's
receipt of the note, approval of the loan, and receipt of loan payments
did not establish proper venue in Cook County. 1 36
Even assuming the Mason court correctly interpreted the General
Assembly's intent in enacting the venue statute, such an interpretation
did not justify that court's adoption of the party-dealings test.1 3 7 A
court could have insulated defendants from suit in places where they
neither resided nor carried on activities by choosing a different test that
limits transaction-based venue to counties where activities were carried
on by the defendant. The party-dealings test, however, limits
transaction-based venue to counties where activities were carried on by
both parties. This further limitation has the potential to make venue
improper in a location where it should be proper according to the Mason
court's interpretation of the General Assembly's intent.
The party-dealings test is too narrow in another way as well. In
personal jurisdiction law-also designed to protect the defendant-the
United States Supreme Court has addressed the analogous question of
what is required for a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant on a contract claim. 13 8 Because many transactions occur via
mail, telephone, or the Internet, with neither party going to the other
party's place of business, the Supreme Court permits a state to base
personal jurisdiction on minimum contacts with the forum state,
including activities the defendant purposefully directed at the forum
state related to the cause of action. 139 This "purposefully directed
activities" test gives potential defendants reasonable control over where
they are subject to suit. 140 At the same time, the test does not permit
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. This version of the General Assembly's intent is also questionable. The Mason court did
not cite legislative history, it cited an appellate court decision. Id. (citing Heldt v. Watts, 69
N.E.2d 97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1946)). The cited decision, in turn, relied on another decision. Heldt, 69
N.E.2d at 98-99 (citing La Ham v. Sterling Canning Co., 52 N.E.2d 467 (111.App. Ct. 1943)).
The La Ham decision relied on a secondary source that said the purpose of transaction-based
venue is trial convenience. La Ham, 52 N:E.2d at 472.
138. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-76 (1985) (discussing
"purposeful availment" for personal jurisdiction).
139. Id. at 476.
140. See id. at 472 (stating that personal jurisdiction doctrine "allows potential defendants to
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and
will not render them liable to suit" (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Supreme Court tied
this concept to that of "reasonable foreseeability." Id. at 476. Because the defendant will be
subject to the jurisdiction of the state by virtue of directing his or her activities toward that state,
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potential defendants to avoid jurisdiction by simply remaining
physically outside of the state and using communications media to
transact business with the state's residents.141 If venue and personal
jurisdiction were viewed in the same way, Cook County would have
been a proper venue in Mason.142
The Mason court's views about transaction-based venue were
rejected in Kenilworth Insurance Co. v. McDougal.143 This decision
addressed a venue issue in a declaratory judgment suit filed by an
insurance company to determine whether its policy provided uninsured
motorist coverage for an accident that had occurred in DuPage
County.144 The dealings between the parties had occurred in Cook
County where the plaintiff insurance company issued the policy.14 5 The
dealings that would have made venue in DuPage County proper were
those dealings between the defendants and a third person, i.e., the
purported unidentified driver. 14 6 According to the Mason decision,
venue should have been improper in DuPage County for lack of

the defendant can control its activities and is not prejudiced by jurisdiction in an unreasonable
location. Id. at 476-77.
141. See id. at 476 ("So long as a commercial actor's efforts are "purposefully directed"
toward residents of another State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of
physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.").
142. Although the oil company sent its representative to Ogle County, the station operator and
his sureties knew the oil company was based in Cook County, they probably knew the loan would
be approved in Cook County, they agreed to send their loan payments to Cook County, and they
ordered merchandise from the oil company's Cook County warehouses. Mason, 273 N.E.2d at
18. The U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a similar contract affiliation between Michigan franchise
owners and a Florida-based fast food franchising company in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 472 (1985), where it applied its "purposefully directed activities" test for personal
jurisdiction. Because the Michigan franchise owners had purposefully directed their activities at
Florida, they were subject to suit in Florida. Id. at 479-80. Similarly, because the station
operator and sureties in Mason had purposefully directed their activities at Cook County, they
should have been subject to suit in Cook County. In Burger King, the U.S. Supreme Court
warned that personal jurisdiction must not be extended arbitrarily to the point that litigation
becomes very difficult for vulnerable parties such as consumers. Id. at 485-86. Similarly, the
Illinois Supreme Court has held that venue must not be extended arbitrarily to the point that the
defense of collection suits becomes very difficult for indigent student borrowers. Williams v. Ill.
State Scholarship Comm'n, 563 N.E.2d 465, 475-76 (Ill. 1990). In Mason, however, the station
operator and his sureties were business persons involved in an arm's length transaction, not
ordinary consumers. Mason, 273 N.E.2d at 17. The 100-mile drive from Ogle County to Cook
County would not have made their defense of the collection suit very difficult. Id.
143. 313 N.E.2d 673 (111.App. Ct. 1974).
144. The coverage issue hinged on whether the insured car had collided with an unidentified
driver's vehicle or, instead, whether the insured had collided with some other object, thus
negating coverage under the uninsured motorist provision. Id at 674.
145. Id. at 675.
146. Id.
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dealings there between the parties to the declaratory action. 147 The
McDougal court held, however, that venue can be based on dealings
with a third person when these dealings have a "definite and direct
bearing on the cause of action."1 48 Transaction-based venue, the
McDougal court explained, is "intended for the convenience of
witnesses . . . and the ease of proving local surroundings where these

may be material, as in the case of an automobile accident."1 49 As a
result, the court found that transaction-based venue was proper at the
site of the accident.15 0
Years after Mason and McDougal, the Illinois Supreme Court
decided Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Commission, a leading

decision on both the due process limit on venue and the meaning of the
general venue statute, in a case that hinged on whether transactionbased venue could be established in a particular county. 15 1 Yet,
following Williams, the requirements for transaction-based venue have
remained unclear because the Supreme Court referenced both the broad
interpretation and the narrow interpretation without saying which
interpretation reflects the Illinois General Assembly's intent. In this
decision, the Supreme Court reviewed the Commission's practice of
filing all guaranteed student loan collection suits in Cook County. 152
These loans are made via a three-step lending process. First, a federal
agency reviews a student's application for compliance with federal
financial need guidelines, prepares a student aid report, and transmits
Second, the
this report electronically to the Commission. 153
Commission approves the student's loan, prepares the necessary
documents including its guarantee, and forwards the documents to the
student and the lender. 154 Third, the student and the lender sign the
documents, the lender makes the loan, and the student makes loan
payments.' 55
The Commission wanted to base venue on its loan guaranty
preparation work in Cook County, but the Illinois Supreme Court

147. See Mason, 273 N.E.2d at 18 (applying the "party dealings" test to find venue
unsupported).
148. McDougal, 313 N.E.2d. at 675.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 675-76 (citation omitted).
Id at 675.
Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm'n, 563 N.E.2d 465, 467 (Ill. 1990).
Id. at 468.
Id
Id
Id.
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rejected this as improper. 156 Instead, the Supreme Court held that Cook
County was a proper venue in suits against borrowers who resided in
other counties only if the borrower obtained the loan in Cook County. 157
First, the Supreme Court quoted one of its earlier decisions stating that
transaction-based venue is proper "where matters occurred that plaintiff
has the burden of proving." 158 This burden-of-proof test is consistent
with and justified by a policy of promoting the convenience of the
witnesses: the Supreme Court had noted that the fewest and least
important witnesses were located at the Commission's offices, while the
most numerous and most important witnesses were located where the
borrowers obtained their loans. 159 Next, the Supreme Court quoted
Appellate Court decisions stating that transaction-based venue requires
"dealings between the parties . . . while they were in an adversarial

position."l 60 This party-dealings test was consistent with and justified
by the policy of promoting the convenience of the defendant: the
Supreme Court commented that indigent borrowers who obtained their
loans in distant counties could not defend collection suits in Cook
County. 16 1 Then, having referred to both the broad and the narrow
interpretations and their respective tests and policies, the Supreme Court
ruled that the loan guaranty processing work involved only "preliminary
and insignificant details," which did not make venue proper in Cook
County.162 Rather, the "integral parts" of the loan transactions occurred
where the borrowers obtained their loans, which made that place the
proper venue. 163
156. Id. In addition to the reasons described in the text, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that
the Commission did not meet its burden of proving where it worked on each loan, i.e., that it
really did the work in Cook County. Id. at 485. The guaranty preparation work was done more
often in Lake County than in Cook County, and the Commission did not record the location of
this work. Id. at 468.
157. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court also held that: (1) a special venue statute making Cook
County the exclusive venue in suits involving delinquent and defaulted student loans violated the
borrowers' constitutional right to due process, and (2) a clause in the loan agreement that
permitted the Commission to file collection suits in Cook County was contrary to public policy
and therefore unenforceable. Id. at 484-87.
158. Id. (quoting People ex rel. Carpentier v. Lange, 134 N.E.2d 266, 268 (111.1956)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
159. Id at 482.
160. Id. at 485 (quoting Winn v. Vogel, 103 N.E.2d 673, 676 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952) and La Ham
v. Sterling Canning Co., 52 N.E.2d 467, 472 (lll. App. Ct. 1943)).
161. Idat475-76.
162. Id at 485.
163. Id The Supreme Court also referred to a test that focuses on the place where the parties'
legal relations were altered, observing that the legal relations between the student borrowers and
the Commission were altered only where the loan agreements were signed, which did not take
place at the Commission's offices. Id.
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Because the Commission's filing practice seemed to violate both
interpretations of transaction-based venue, the Illinois Supreme Court
understandably did not decide which interpretation is correct. However,
by not choosing between the conflicting interpretations, the Supreme
Court left the scope of transaction-based venue unclear. If a breach of
contract suit raises a venue issue, absent clear controlling precedent, a
lower court cannot easily decide whether venue is proper in a situation
where the burden-of-proof test would permit venue but the partydealings test would forbid it.
2. Tort Claims
In tort suits that involve personal injury or death, the burden-of-proof
test applied under the broad interpretation of transaction-based venue
permits venue to be based on (i) the defendant's act or omission, 1 64 or
(ii) the injury or death. 16 5 If the defendant acted negligently in more
than one county, or if the plaintiff suffered cumulative injuries in more
than one county, venue is proper in each of these counties. 166
The burden-of-proof test, if applied literally, would permit venue to
be based on the location where expenses claimed as money damages
accrued. For example, in a suit that seeks recovery of medical
expenses, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the treatment
occurred. The plaintiff might receive specialized treatment at a
metropolitan hospital, follow-up treatment from a family doctor, and
physical therapy at a clinic recommended by the plaintiff's attorney. If
the plaintiff claims the costs of treatment as damages, the burden-ofproof test seems to make venue proper in the counties where the

164. See Wier ex rel. Wier v. Ketterer, 479 N.E.2d 416, 416-17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (holding
venue proper in St. Clair County in a suit based on a Clinton County physician's failure to
provide for proper medical supervision of a patient during transport in an ambulance that passed
through St. Clair County).
165. See Wier, 479 N.E.2d at 417 (holding venue proper in St. Clair County when a Clinton
County physician's negligent supervision of an ambulance transfer caused the plaintiff's
hypoglycemia and hypoxia in St. Clair County); Tipton v. Estate of Cusick, 651 N.E.2d 635, 637
(Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding venue proper in Cook County when negligence in writing and filling
prescriptions in DuPage County caused the plaintiffs stroke in Cook County); Bradbury v. St.
Mary's Hosp. of Kankakee, 652 N.E.2d 1228, 1230 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding venue proper in
Cook County when negligent acts in delivery of a baby in Kankakee County led to the baby's
death in Cook County).
166. See Kaiser v. Doll-Pollard, 923 N.E.2d 927, 935-936 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (holding venue
proper in St. Clair County in a medical malpractice suit that arose out of surgery in Clinton
County followed by post-operative surgery in St. Clair County to stop internal bleeding, because
the defendants' "ongoing negligence" and the plaintiff's "cumulative injuries" occurred partly in
St. Clair County).
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metropolitan hospital, the family doctor, or the physical therapy clinic
are located.
A court likely would decide, however, that venue cannot be based on
the location where expenses claimed as money damages accrued. Such
a decision is supported by the venue decisions that refer to the last-event
rule. 1 67 This rule distinguishes between the last event required to create
tort liability-the injury or death-and later events that only add to the
plaintiffs losses.168 The treatment given by the metropolitan hospital,
the family doctor, and the physical therapy clinic are post-injury events
that only add to the losses caused by the injury. Under the last-event
rule, venue cannot be based on this treatment.
However, the two proper bases for venue-the act or omission and
the injury or death-still give plaintiffs some latitude to serve their own
purposes instead of the convenience of the witnesses. The act or
omission or the subsequent injury might have occurred partly in a
county where no witness resides or works, but the plaintiff might
nevertheless choose to sue in this county if its juries and judges seem
more favorable.1 69
The party-dealings test applied under the narrow interpretation of
transaction-based venue gives the plaintiff less latitude to forum shop,
but it creates the "indirect dealings" problem described in the
Introduction. 170 In Boxdorfer v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,17 1 the
167. See Bradbury, 652 N.E.2d at 1230 (holding that venue is proper in a wrongful death suit
where the death occurred because death is not only an element of such an action, "it is the last
element necessary to render an actor liable for the pecuniary injuries suffered by the surviving
spouse and next of kin"); Smith v. Silver Cross Hosp., 726 N.E.2d 697, 701-02 (Ill. App. Ct.
2000) (following Bradbury). In Bradbury, the appellate court referred to the place of the wrong
rule, based on where the last event takes place, which is necessary to render the actor liable, citing
the Illinois Supreme Court's application of this rule in its best-known personal jurisdiction
decision. Bradbury, 652 N.E.2d at 1230 (citing Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961)). Gray, in turn, relied on the place of the wrong rule used in
section 377 of the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws. Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 762-63 ("[I]n
law the place of a wrong is where the last event takes place which is necessary to render the actor
liable."). Bradbury does not explain why the rule should transfer from the personal jurisdiction
and conflict of laws contexts to the venue context. Bradbury,652 N.E.2d at 1230. Nevertheless,
because occurrence witnesses often are located where the victim sustained injury or died, the rule
is consistent with the witness convenience policy underlying transaction-based venue.
168.

Cf RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 377

n.1 (1934) (stating that the "last

event" necessary to create liability takes place where the person suffers bodily harm, not where
the person later goes and suffers other loss).
169. See, e.g., Wier, 479 N.E.2d at 416-17 (upholding plaintiffs choice of St. Clair County);
supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (discussing the "part of the transaction" problem
illustrated by Wier).
170. See supratext accompanying notes 29-30 (discussing the "indirect dealings" problem).
App. Ct. 2003).
171. 790 N.E.2d 391 (111.
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Appellate Court applied the party-dealings test in a consumer fraud suit
that accused a car manufacturer of failing to disclose a defect that
caused paint to delaminate from its cars after the warranty expired. 172
The paint delamination had occurred in Madison County on cars sold by
Madison County car dealers to Madison County residents, two of whom
sued the manufacturer on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly
situated car buyers. 173 Under the burden-of-proof test, Madison County
would have been a proper venue because the plaintiffs had the burden of
proving the deceptions and losses. 174 Yet, because the Appellate Court
applied the party-dealings test, Madison County was not a proper
venue. 175 The car manufacturer had dealt only with the car dealersand then only in Michigan, where the manufacturer had its principal
place of business. 176 Thus, venue was not proper in Madison County
where the consumers lived.177
The Boxdorfer decision repeats an error highlighted earlier. In
personal jurisdiction law-also designed to protect the defendant-the
United States Supreme Court has addressed the analogous question of
what is required for a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
manufacturer on a consumer's or product user's claim in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.17 8 The Supreme Court said a state may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a corporation that "delivers its
products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will
be purchased by consumers in the forum State." 179 Such a test allows a
manufacturer that markets in a state where it has no plant, warehouse, or
physical presence to be sued in certain circumstances in that state. 180 if
172. Id at 392.
173. Id. at 392-93.
174. See Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co., 776 N.E.2d 151, 160, 164 (Ill. 2002) (discussing the
meaning of the elements of a consumer fraud claim); Martin v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 643
N.E.2d 734, 754 (111.1994) (identifying the elements plaintiff must prove on a common law fraud
claim and a consumer fraud claim). The deceptions occurred at least partly in Madison County
when the car buyers were told nothing about the paint defect at the time of sale, and the losses
occurred in Madison County when the paint delaminated from the cars. Boxdorfer, 790 N.E.2d at
393.
175. Id. at 397-99.
176. 1d. at 393, 399.
177. Id. at 399.
178. See 444 U.S. 286, 294-95 (1980) (holding that due process may divest a state of
jurisdiction despite the state being a convenient forum).
179. Id. at 297-98 (citing Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761
(Ill. 1961)).
180. See id at 298 (holding that a local dealer and regional distributor were not subject to
jurisdiction in a state where the only contact related to the car buyers' personal injury claim was
created by the car buyers' own unilateral activity in driving the car to a state remote from where
they had bought the car).
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venue and personal jurisdiction were viewed in the same way, the car
manufacturer's use of Madison County dealers as sales agents would
prove its intent to serve the Madison County market and would make it
subject to suit there on claims arising out of this activity.181
In light of the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Williams,
however, the Boxdorfer decision is somewhat understandable. In
Williams, the Illinois Supreme Court did not tell lower courts what to do
when the burden-of-proof test indicates venue is proper but the partydealings test indicates it is improper.182 The car buyers' suit in
Boxdorfer presented this very dilemma. Forced to choose between the
burden-of-proof test and the party-dealings test, the Illinois Appellate
Court chose the party-dealings test.183 Yet, the appellate court should
have noticed that its decision in Boxdorfer and the Supreme Court's
decision in Williams had opposite effects: the latter protected the
convenience of the consumer while the former did not. 184 It seems then
181. Competing stream of commerce theories have been endorsed by various Supreme Court
Justices. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (endorsing the narrow stream of commerce theory); id. at 11621 (Brennan, J., concurring) (endorsing the broad stream of commerce theory). The division
continues within the Supreme Court about the question unanswered by Asahi. See J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion)
(stating that the transmission of goods permits a state to exercise jurisdiction only if the defendant
can be said to have "targeted" the state, not simply "predicted" that its goods will reach the state);
id at 2791-92 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that a state cannot exercise jurisdiction based on a
"single isolated sale" without "something more," but declining to adopt a broad rule without full
consideration of the consequences); id at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that a state can
exercise jurisdiction over a manufacturer "seeking to exploit a multistate or global market" when
its product was sold in the state and caused injury to a local plaintiff). These opinions give
potential defendants different degrees of control over where they are subject to suit, but none of
them allow a car manufacturer to use in-state dealers as sales agents and escape jurisdiction on a
claim arising in that state out of sales of its cars made by those dealers. The use of in-state
dealers as sales agents counts as "targeting" rather than merely "predicting." See Asahi, 480 U.S.
at 112 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (treating the use of in-state dealers as purposefully
directed activity). Moreover, the use of in-state dealers leads to regular sales in the state, not a
single isolated sale with nothing more. Finally, the use of in-state dealers as part of a nationwide
network of dealers counts as an effort to exploit a multistate market.
182. Williams v. Ill. State Scholarship Comm'n, 563 N.E.2d 465, 485-86 (111. 1990).
183. Boxdorfer v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 790 N.E.2d 391, 398 (111.App. Ct. 2003) ("[T]here
were no direct dealings in Madison County between the plaintiffs and the defendant.").
184. In Williams, the Supreme Court made venue convenient for consumers by limiting
transaction-based venue to the county where the consumers (student borrowers) obtained their
loans. See supra text accompanying notes 152-63. In Boxdorfer, the appellate court made venue
inconvenient for consumers (car buyers) by making transaction-based venue unavailable in the
county where the consumers bought their cars. Boxdorfer, 790 N.E.2d at 399; id. at 400
(Goldenhersh, J., dissenting). Because the appellate court held that venue was improper on the
plaintiffs' individual claims, it did not decide how the general venue statute applies in class action
suits. In suits brought by co-plaintiffs as individuals, rather than as class representatives, each
plaintiff must meet the transaction-based venue requirements. See Peterson v. Monsanto Co., 510
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that the appellate court needs clarification to correctly determine venue
in consumer fraud suits.
II. THE CONVENIENCE-BASED PROPOSALS

The Introduction and Part I foreshadowed the changes needed to
align venue more closely with convenience. Part II now explains how
Illinois could reach a closer alignment by adopting this Article's
proposals for (a) defendant-based venue, (b) transaction-based venue,
(c) any-county venue, and (d) venue procedure. Appendix A sets forth
these proposals, which are described and cited to herein. 185
A. Defendant-BasedVenue

The proposal for defendant-based venue would make venue proper
where "the greatest number of defendants are located."18 6 This form of
venue would replace residence-based venue. The proposal has rules for
suits against (1) an individual, (2) a legal entity, (3) a legal
representative, or (4) multiple defendants.
1. Individual Defendant
Under the proposals, if the defendant is an individual, venue would
be proper in the county (or counties) where "the individual has a regular
dwelling place or a regular work place." 187 A "regular dwelling place"
would be a place where, at the time the suit is filed, the individual (i) "is
living," and (ii) "has lived or intends to continue living" for at least one
N.E.2d 458, 461-62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (holding, in a suit based on the failure to warn of the
dangerous and permanent effects of dioxin, a chemical contained in the defendant's herbicide,
that venue was proper in Madison County on the claims of the five plaintiffs who sprayed the
herbicide in that county but that venue was improper on the claims of the plaintiffs who never
sprayed the herbicide in Madison County). No reported decision considers whether and how this
each-plaintiff rule applies in class action suits. In the federal courts, all of the named
representatives must meet the federal venue requirements but unnamed class members need not
meet the requirements. United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1129 (2d Cir. 1974);
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004); JAMES W. MOORE, 17
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

§

110.07 (3d ed. 2011).

185. In addition to the proposals discussed in the text, the proposed special venue statute
includes special venue provisions that cover (i) ordinance enforcement actions by municipalities
that extend into more than one county, and (ii) enforcement actions regarding child support
payments sent to the State Disbursement Unit and returned by the bank or depository. See infra
These are edited versions of the provisions now containedAppendix A § 2-103.
inappropriately-in the general venue statute. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101 (2010) (setting
forth these provisions in the second and fourth paragraphs).
186. See infra Appendix A § 2-101(a) ("Venue is proper in the county (or counties) where the
greatest number of defendants is located.").
187. See infra id. ("An individual is located in the county (or counties) where the individual
has a regular dwelling place or a regular work place.").
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year.1 88 A "regular work place" is a place where, at the time the suit is
filed, the individual (i) "is working or physically reporting for work,"1 89
(ii) "has worked or physically reported for work" for at least one
year,190 and (iii) "has worked or physically reported for work" for at
least 150 days during the preceding one-year period.191 Once an
individual has a regular dwelling place or a regular work place, it would
remain such a place despite a "temporary absence" that "is intended to
last and has lasted" for less than a year.19 2
The regular dwelling place rule would change proper venue for only
a few individuals. Most individuals have one regular dwelling place at
a time, and this place is their residence. For these individuals, the
proposed regular dwelling place rule would make venue proper in the
same county as the current residence rule. 193 A few individuals,
however, have a regular dwelling place that is not their residence. As
discussed below, some defendants have their residence where they no
longer live; others live in two places, only one of which can be their
residence.19 4 For these individuals, the proposed rule would make
venue proper in a different-or additional-county.
The first difference between the proposed regular dwelling place rule
and the current residence rule is illustrated by Webb v. Morgan, where
188. See infra id § 2-102(a)(1) ("A 'regular dwelling place' is a place where, at the time the
suit is filed, the individual (i) is living, and (ii) has lived or intends to continue living for at least
one year."). The "intends to continue living" part of the regular dwelling place duration
requirement recognizes that if an individual intends to keep a new dwelling place for at least a
year, it becomes a convenient place for him or her to defend suits upon moving in. But cf
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS

§

16 cmt. b (1971) (noting that courts and writers

sometimes say physical presence, even for a moment, is enough to establish a domicile, though
for most purposes the person must have been there "for a time at least").
189. See infra Appendix A § 2-102(a)(2). The "physically reported for work" alternative
describes an individual, such as a route driver, who has transient work locations, but who reports
at the start of the workday to a central office, terminal, or similar place. The alternative does not
cover reporting by telephone or Internet, which would not indicate the county where the
individual reports for work is a convenient place to defend suits.
190. See infra id. Unlike the regular dwelling place duration requirement, the regular work
place duration requirement would not be met by the intent to continue working at the place for at
least one year, due to the greater risk that a new job will end during the first year despite the
individual's intent.
191. See infra id. ("A 'regular work place' is a place where, at the time the suit is filed, the
individual (i) is working or physically reporting for work, (ii) has worked or physically reported
for work for at least one year, and (iii) has worked or physically reported for work on at least 150
days during the preceding one-year period.").
192. See infra id. § 2-102(a)(3) ("A regular dwelling place or a regular work place remains
such a place during a temporary absence that is intended to last, and has lasted, for less than a
year.").
193. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101 (2010).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49.
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one codefendant asserted that the other codefendant had been joined for
the purposes of fixing venue. 195 At the time the suit was filed, the other
codefendant had been living in a mobile home park in Sangamon
County for more than a year. 196 Yet, he owned a boarded-up house in
St. Clair County. 197 During the ten years since he had last lived in the
house, he moved to places where he found work without developing
strong ties to those places.198 Because he still thought of St. Clair
County as his home, and the "intent of the party whose residence is in
question is the controlling factor," 199 he still had his "residence" in St.
Clair County.200 Therefore, under Illinois's general venue statute,
venue was proper in a St. Clair County suit based on a slip and fall at
the Sangamon County mobile home park.20 '
Under the proposed regular dwelling place rule, however, the proper
venue would not be St. Clair County. The house would not be his
regular dwelling place-he had lived away from it longer than the
period allowed for a temporary absence. The mobile home park would
be his regular dwelling place-he was living there, and he met the oneyear duration requirement.
These facts illustrate how the regular dwelling place rule, not the
residence rule, aligns venue more closely with convenience. For
individuals whose regular dwelling place differs from their residence,
the more convenient place to defend suits is not the place they still think
of as home despite not living there for many years. The more
convenient place is where they are living when the suit is filed.
The second difference between the proposed regular dwelling place
rule and the current residence rule is illustrated by Long v. Gray.202
195. 531 N.E.2d 36,40 (111. App. Ct. 1988).
196.

Id. at 37-38.

197. Id. at 42.
198. Id. The court noted that the venue-fixing defendant had lived in Sangamon County but
intended to move back to East St. Louis as soon as he could afford to live there. Id. at 43.
Moreover, the codefendant acknowledged that it had been easier for him to find work in
Sangamon County. Id. Yet, the court considered no set of facts that indicated that the
codefendant actually had a reasonable way of returning to or residing in East St. Louis, nor a time
frame in which he intended to do so. Under such a scenario, the codefendant's actual presence in
Sangamon County was indefinite, but nevertheless, the indefinitely maintained residence in East
St. Louis was deemed to establish proper venue in St. Clair County.
199. Id. at 41.
200. Id.
201. Id This defendant was the plaintiffs relative, and therefore filing the suit in St. Clair
County likely was forum shopping aimed at the co-defendant, who was a Sangamon County
resident. Id.
202. 714 N.E.2d 1041 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999), abrogatedon other grounds by Corral v. Mervis
2005). The plaintiff sued three defendants, fixing venue partly on the
Indus., 839 N.E.2d 524 (111.
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During the ten-year period before the individual was sued, he had lived
in both Kankakee County and Cook County. 20 3 In Kankakee County,
he had lived in his sister's mobile home; in Cook County, he had lived
in his girlfriend's apartment.20 4 He testified that he resided at the
mobile home and, in fact, his driver's license and car registration listed
the mobile home's address. 20 5 His girlfriend testified, however, that he
had lived and paid rent continuously at her apartment for a year before
the suit was filed-though during this period, he still had visited the
mobile home a couple of times per week and had paid part of its rent.2 06
After weighing this conflicting evidence, the court found he was a Cook
County "resident." 207 Therefore, under Illinois's general venue statute,
venue was proper in a Cook County suit based on a traffic accident in
southern Illinois. 208
Under the proposed regular dwelling place rule, venue would be
proper in Cook County but also would be proper in Kankakee County.
The apartment would be his regular dwelling place-he was living
there, 209 and he met the duration requirement. 210 The mobile home also
would be his regular dwelling place-he continued to visit and pay rent,
so he never ceased living there, 2 11 and he met the duration
requirement. 212
These facts further illustrate how the regular dwelling place rule, not
the residence rule, aligns venue more closely with convenience. 'The
regular dwelling place rule recognizes that the convenience of an
individual who is living in two counties does not require that proper
venue be restricted to the county where the individual's ties are
strongest. Both counties can be proper venues.
Unlike the proposed regular dwelling place rule-which would
change proper venue for relatively -few individuals-the proposed
regular work place rule would change proper venue for two large
basis of the "residence" of the individual described in the text. Id. at 1044-46.
203. Id at 1043.
204. Id
205. Id. at 1045.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1046.
208. Id at 1046-47.
209. Id. at 1043.
210. See infra Appendix A § 2-102(a)(1) ("A 'regular dwelling place' is a place where, at the
time the suit is filed, the individual (i) is living, and (ii) has lived or intends to continue living for
at least one year.").
211. Long, 714 N.E.2d at 1045.
212. See supra note 210 (his mobile home residency would satisfy the same duration period as
the apartment residency).
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groups. 2 1 3 The first group is the many individuals who work in a
county different from the county where they live. For these individuals,
the regular work place rule would make their work place county another
proper venue. 2 14 The convenience of these individuals, should they be
forced to defend a lawsuit in that county, would still be served because
at the time the suit is filed, that county would be a place where the
individual has strong ties and has worked or physically reported for
work on a regular basis. The second group is the many individuals who
work in Illinois but live in adjacent states. For those individuals, the
regular work place rule would make their work place county the only
county where defendant-based venue would be proper. Because the
nonresident defendant would have to make frequent trips into the state
for work, this county is presumably a convenient location for the
defendant to defend a lawsuit and almost assuredly more convenient
than some far off county across the state. Thus, the proposed rule
would align venue with the convenience of the nonresident defendant
far better than the current rule that all Illinois counties are proper venues
in suits against such nonresidents. 215
Under the proposals, if an individual defendant moves frequently and
changes jobs frequently, the individual might have neither a regular
dwelling place nor a regular work place. If so, these moves and job
changes would prevent the use of defendant-based venue under the
proposals. The plaintiff, however, would simply use the proposal for
transaction-based venue or the proposal for any-county venue. In a suit
based on a transaction that occurred in Illinois, the proposal for
transaction-based venue would make the county where the transaction
occurred the proper venue.216 In a suit based on a transaction that
213. See infra Appendix A § 2-102(a)(2) ("A 'regular work place' is a place where, at the
time the suit is filed, the individual (i) is working or physically reporting for work, (ii) has
worked or physically reported for work for at least one year, and (iii) has worked or physically
reported for work on at least 150 days during the preceding one-year period.").
214. The facts presented in a case decided under the Illinois service of process statutes
illustrate how the regular work place proposal and the regular dwelling place proposal would
work. In United Bank ofLoves Park v. Dohi, 450 N.E.2d 974 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983), the defendant
had a job in Chicago as a commodity investment program salesman, a house in Rockford where
his wife and children lived and where he spent time on weekends, and an apartment in Chicago
where he generally lived during the work week. Id. at 976-78. The plaintiffs made substitute
service on him at the house in Rockford, which was proper only if his "usual place of abode" was
there. Id. at 976. This living arrangement lasted for just four months, until a downturn in the
commodities market led to a job change. Id. If this job and the living arrangement had lasted for
a year, however, the individual would have a regular work place in Cook County and regular
dwelling places in both Winnebago County and Cook County, making venue proper in both
counties under the proposals offered here.
215. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101 (2010).
216. See infra Appendix A § 2-101(b) ("Venue is proper in the county (or counties) where the
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occurred outside Illinois, which would prevent the use of transactionbased venue, the any-county venue proposal would make all Illinois
counties proper venues. 217 In this circumstance, no county would serve
either the convenience of the defendant or the convenience of the
witnesses, so the plaintiff justifiably would have an unlimited choice of
counties in which to sue.
2. Legal Entity Defendant
If the defendant is a legal entity, the proposed uniform rule for legal
entities would determine proper venue.2 18 This rule would replace the
current rules that determine the "residence" of private corporations one
way, partnerships a second way, unincorporated associations a third
way, and governmental corporations a fourth way. 219 The proposed
rule's underlying premise is that the convenience of defending suits in a
county does not depend on the form of an entity's legal organization.
Convenience depends instead on the extent of the entity's presence in
the county and how this presence compares with the entity's presence in
other counties. Accordingly, the proposed uniform rule has a series of
presence tests that would be applied in a specified order.
First, venue would be proper in the county (or counties) where the
legal entity has "fifty or more regular workers at its place or places of
business." 220 The fifty-worker test identifies a large presence in the
county-sufficiently large to make defending suits convenient despite
any greater presence the entity might have in another county. An
individual would count as a "regular worker" if, at the time the suit is
filed, the individual (i) "is working for the legal entity in any capacity,
including as an employee, sole proprietor, partner, or independent
contractor;" (ii) "has worked or physically reported for work" at the
place for at least one year; and (iii) "has worked or physically reported
transaction occurred that gave rise to the cause of action.").
217. See infra id. § 2-101(c) ("If there is no county where venue is proper under paragraphs
(a)-(b), venue is proper in any county.").
218. See infra id. § 2-102(b) ("A legal entity-including any type of corporation, partnership,
or unincorporated association-is located in the county (or counties) identified by the following
presence tests applied in the specified order.").
219. See infra Part II.A.2.a-d (discussing how the proposed uniform rule would solve certain
problems inherent in the current legal entity residence rules).
220. See infra Appendix A § 2-102(b)(1) ("The legal entity is located in the county (or
counties) where it has 50 or more regular workers at its place or places of business. An
individual is a 'regular worker' if, at the time the suit is filed, the individual (i) is working for the
legal entity in any capacity, including as an employee, sole proprietor, partner, or independent
contractor; (ii) has worked or physically reported for work at the place for at least one year; and
(iii) has worked or physically reported for work at the place on at least 150 days during the
preceding one-year period.").
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for work" at the place on at least 150 days during the preceding oneyear period.22 1
Second, if no county meets the fifty-worker test, venue would be
proper in the county (or counties) where the legal entity has "ten or
more regular workers at its place or places of business." 222 The tenworker test identifies a medium-size presence in the county-one that
makes defending suits convenient if there is no county where the entity
has a large presence. The previously-described "regular worker"
definition again would identify which individuals help reach the tenworker threshold. 223
Third, if no county meets the fifty-worker and ten-worker tests, venue
would be proper in the county (or counties) where the legal entity has "a
place of business." 224 The place-of-business test identifies a small
presence in the county-one that makes defending suits convenient if
there is no county where the entity has a large or medium-size presence.
Finally, if no county meets the first three tests, venue would be
proper in the county (or counties) where the legal entity is "doing
business." 225 The doing-business test identifies the smallest significant
presence in the county-one that makes defending suits convenient only
if there is no better alternative.
These presence tests would narrow venue in suits against private
corporations and broaden venue in suits against governmental
corporations. In suits against private corporations, the presence tests
would not base venue on (i) a registered office, if it is not the private
corporation's own place of business, (ii) a place of business, if it is
small relative to the private corporation's other places of business, or
(iii) doing business, if the private corporation has a place of business in
Illinois. In suits against governmental corporations, the presence tests
would base venue not only on the governmental corporation's principal
office, 22 6 but also on any other place of business that would meet the
same presence test.
221.

Seeinfraid

222. See infra id. § 2-102(b)(2) ("If no county meets the test of subparagraph (1), the legal
entity is located in the county (or counties) where it has 10 or more regular workers (see
subparagraph (1)) at its place or places of business.").
223.

See infra id

224. See infra id § 2-102(b)(3) ("If no county meets the tests of subparagraphs (1)-(2), the
legal entity is located in the county (or counties) where the legal entity has a place of business.").
225. See infra id § 2-102(b)(4) ("If no county meets the tests of subparagraphs (1)-(3), the
legal entity is located in the county (or counties) where the legal entity is doing business.").
226. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-103(a) (2010) ("Actions must be brought against a public,
municipal, governmental or quasi-municipal corporation in the county in which its principal
office is located or in the county in which the transaction or some part thereof occurred out of
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For each of the four types of legal entities, the proposed uniform rule
would solve a series of problems caused by the current legal entity
residence rules.
a. Private Corporations
The proposed uniform rule would solve three problems caused by the
residence rule for private corporations. It would solve the registered
office and small office problems 2 27 and the doing business litigation

problem. 22 8

Torres v. Walsh,229 a Cook County lawsuit brought against a
Sangamon County hospital, illustrates the registered office problem.
This suit was based on medical treatment in Sangamon County, but
Cook County was a proper venue because the hospital's parent
corporation had its registered office at an outside entity's place of
business in Cook County. 2 30 The suit arrived in Sangamon County only
after time-consuming and costly intrastate forum non conveniens
litigation. 2 3 1 Under the proposed uniform rule, the proper venue would
be Sangamon County because the corporation's own place of
business-the hospital-was located there.2 32 No intrastate forum non
conveniens litigation would occur.
Corralv. Mervis Indus., Inc.,233 a Cook County suit brought against a
Vermillion County recycling company, illustrates the small office
which the cause of action arose.").
227. See supranotes 11-17 and accompanying text (identifying these problems).
228. See supraPart I.A.2.a.ii (identifying this problem).
229. 456 N.E.2d 601 (Ill. 1983).
230. Id. at 603.
231. Id at 607.
232. See supra notes 218-25 and accompanying text (outlining the venue rules for legal
entities).
233. Corral v. Mervis Indus., Inc., 839 N.E.2d 524 (111.2005). Corral is significant for an
additional, albeit indirectly related, reason. The Illinois Supreme Court's holding in Corral
abrogated many lower Appellate Court opinions that had considered whether venue was proper,
but on a different point of law than those discussed in this Article. The Court considered which
standard of review should be applied to a trial court's determination of proper venue. Id. at 52730. Previously, in Stambaugh v. Int'l Harvester Co., 464 N.E.2d 1011 (111. 1984), the Illinois
Supreme Court had applied an abuse of discretion standard to review a determination of proper
venue in the trial court, but without explaining why it was applying this standard. Corral,464
N.E.2d at 528. In Corral,however, the Court noted that it had subsequently clarified the correct
standards for review of factual versus legal questions presented to the trial court. Id. at 529. The
Supreme Court noted that a determination of proper venue required a two-step analysis by the
trial court. In the first step, the trial court must make factual findings about the parties. Id. at
530. These factual findings are to be given deference and only disturbed by the Appellate Court
if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. Next, the trial court must apply the
venue statute to the facts in order to determine whether venue is proper. Id. This is a question of
law to be reviewed de novo. Id. Since Corral clarified these standards, it abrogated those
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problem. The suit was based on an accident in Vermillion County, but
Cook County again was a proper venue, this time because the
corporation had a salesperson who worked out of a home-office in Cook
County.2 3 4 Under the proposed rule, the proper venue would be in
Vermillion County and not in Cook County because the recycling
company's Vermillion County yard would surely meet the ten-worker
test, while the salesperson's home-office in Cook County would not.2 3 5
Stambaugh v. International Harvester Co., 236 a St. Clair County
lawsuit stemming from a tractor fire in Brown County, illustrates the
doing business litigation problem. The tractor manufacturer had no
place of business in St. Clair County, but it did support sales of its
equipment in St. Clair County through St. Clair County farm equipment
dealers. 237 At the time the case was decided, it was unclear whether
sales-support activities would meet the doing business test.2 38 The
Illinois Supreme Court reversed the result of the St. Clair County trial
based on the circuit court's venue ruling and remanded with directions
to transfer the suit for retrial in a proper venue 23 9-a needless waste of
judicial time and resources. Under the proposed rule, however, this
waste would rarely occur. Doing business would rank fourth as a basis
for venue-used only when the defendant has no place of business in
Illinois. 24 0 Assuming the proposed rules governed at the time, the
farmer's attorney in Stambaugh would have known that the suit had to
be filed either in one of the counties where the tractor manufacturer had
its headquarters or manufacturing plants, or in the county where the

opinions that had misapplied the abuse of discretion standard but did not abrogate the legal
findings of those courts per se.
234. Id. at 526.
235. See infraAppendix A § 2-102(b)(2) ("Ifno county meets the test of subparagraph (1), the
legal entity is located in the county (or counties) where it has 10 or more regular workers (see
subparagraph (1)) at its place or places of business."). The decision mentions that the recycling
company had other yards in Champaign, Mattoon, and Springfield. Corral,839 N.E.2d at 526. If
those other yards would meet the same presence test as the Danville yard, Champaign County,
Coles County, and Sangamon County also would be proper venues.
236. 464 N.E.2d 1011 (111. 1984).
237. Id. at 1013-14.
238. See id. (noting that the Illinois Supreme Court had not construed the term "doing
business" before the Mosele decision, which did not address a manufacturer's sales-support
activity).
239. Id. at 1017.
240. See infra Appendix A § 2-102(b)(4) ("If no county meets the tests of subparagraphs (l)(3), the legal entity is located in the county (or counties) where the legal entity is doing
business.").
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No venue-related retrial would have been

b. Partnerships
The proposed uniform rule would solve three problems caused by the
residence rule for partnerships. It would solve the small office and
doing business litigation problems, which can occur with
partnerships. 242 It also would solve the partner residence problem,
illustrated earlier by the hypothetical Madison County suit against the
limited partnership that owned an office building in Lake County. 24 3
The hypothetical suit was based on an accident in Lake County, but
Madison County was a proper venue because a limited partner resided
there. 244 Under the proposed rule, however, Lake County would be the
proper venue. The proposed rule would not base venue on a limited
partner's residence-nor on a general partner's residence-but rather on
the limited partnership's place of business. 245
c. Unincorporated Associations
The proposed rule for unincorporated associations would solve two
problems caused by the residence rule for unincorporated associations,
including limited liability companies. Once again, the rule would solve
the small office problem, which can occur with unincorporated
associations. 246 It also would close a venue gap, illustrated earlier by
the hypothetical suit against the Indiana-based trucking company.247
This limited liability company regularly picked up and delivered freight
in White County, and it operated the truck that collided with a White

241.

See infra id.

242. The residence rule for partnerships, like the residence rule for private corporations, bases
venue on the entity's offices and on doing business. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102(b) (2010).
243. See supra text accompanying note 87 (discussing the partner residence problem).
244. See supra text accompanying note 87 (interpreting the partnership residence provision to
refer to all partners including limited partners, as the Montana venue statute has been interpreted
by the Montana Supreme Court, but noting a contrary interpretation of the Georgia Constitution's
copartner venue provision).
245. The same rules would apply to all legal entities. See generally infra Appendix A § 2102(b)(1)-(4) (outlining the procedure for determining residence for legal entities).
246. The residence rule for unincorporated associations, like the residence rule for private
corporations, bases venue on the entity's offices. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102(c).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96 (discussing the potential for a "venue gap" for
unincorporated associations). This illustration assumed that, by process of elimination, a limited
liability company counts as an unincorporated association under the Illinois venue statutes. See
supra text accompanying notes 90-91 (stating the assumption and noting that one state has
deemed limited liability companies partnerships for venue purposes if they are treated as
partnerships for tax purposes).
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County resident's car just across the border in Indiana. 248 Residencebased venue was unavailable, because (i) the trucking company had
neither an Illinois office nor an officer with an Illinois residence, which
prevented it from residing in any county; and (ii) it was doing business
in Illinois, which prevented it from being a nonresident. 249 Transactionbased venue was also unavailable, because the suit was based on an
Indiana accident.250 The Illinois courts might have personal jurisdiction
over the trucking company under the long-arm statute, 251 but there is no
proper venue. Under the proposed rule, however, White County would
be the proper venue, because venue would be based on doing business
when a legal entity has no place of business in Illinois. 2 52
d. Governmental Corporations
The proposed uniform rule would solve the inequality problem,
which was illustrated by the suit against the IDR in Home Depot,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Department of Revenue.2 53 In this suit, DuPage County
was not a proper venue, despite the presence of the IDR's fifty-person
office, because the office was not the IDR's principal office. 2 54 Yet, the
same office-or even a one-person office-would have made venue
proper in a suit against a private corporation. 255
Governmental corporations claim to need special venue protection so
public officials can remain at home and discharge their public duties.256
This public interest rationale is, however, not convincing. In the
leading decision giving this rationale, the defendant hospital corporation
lost its venue objection for failing to prove it had municipal corporate

248. See supra text accompanying note 96 (illustrating how the proposed rule for
unincorporated associations would solve the earlier hypothetical problem).
249. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102(c).
250. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101.
251. See supra note 96 (citing an Appellate Court decision holding that Illinois could exercise
jurisdiction in analogous circumstances, but noting that the latest U.S. Supreme Court decision
about general jurisdiction leaves the proper scope of this form of jurisdiction unclear).
252. See infra Appendix A § 2-102(b)(4) ("Ifno county meets the tests of subparagraphs (1)(3), the legal entity is located in the county (or counties) where the legal entity is doing
business.").
253. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 823 N.E.2d 625, 632 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005),
abrogated on other grounds by Corral v. Mervis Indus., Inc., 839 N.E.2d 524 (Ill. 2005).
254. Id. at 634.
255. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102(a) ("Any private corporation ... organized under the
laws of this State . . . is a resident of any county in which it has its registered office or other office
or is doing business.").
256. See Alsup v. Sycamore Mun. Hosp., 618 N.E.2d 895, 898 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (giving
this rationale).
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status as of the time the suit was filed.2 5 7 Due to this failure of proof,
the special venue statute for governmental corporations did not apply,
and the hospital had to defend in a county where it did not have its
principal office. 2 58 Whether the public interest demanded that the
hospital's officials remain at home to conduct hospital business surely
did not depend on whether the hospital had municipal corporate status at
the time it was sued.
The public interest rationale wrongly assumes that all governmental
corporations need special venue protection in all suits. In the rare suit
that really does threaten to divert a public official from important and
pressing public business, the courts can weigh this cost, together with
other private interests and public interests, in deciding whether to grant
an intrastate forum non conveniens transfer.2 5 9 The public interest
requires nothing more.
The proposed uniform rule would end the inequality of treatment by
applying the previously described series of presence tests to
governmental corporations.260 Usually, these presence tests would
yield the same result as the current principal office test. Most
governmental corporations do not have a place of business outside the
county where their principal office is located; or, if they do, their place
of business in a different county would meet a lower-priority presence
test than the test met by their principal office.2 6 1 For example, if a city
has fifty individuals who regularly work at its place or places of
business in the county where its principal office is located, the city
could have as many as forty-nine individuals who regularly work at a
place of business in another county without the other county becoming a
proper venue. 262
In suits against some large governmental corporations, the proposed
uniform rules' presence tests would make venue proper in an additional
county, allowing the plaintiff more flexibility without sacrificing the
defendant's convenience. For example, in County of Fulton v. Prairie
Plan Project, a suit to enforce an ordinance against the Metropolitan
Sanitary District of Greater Chicago, Fulton County was not a proper
venue under the special venue statute, despite the District's employment
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (listing the private interest and public interest
factors that go into a court'sforum non conveniens determination).
260. See supranote 218 (noting that the same proposed rules apply to all legal entities).
261. See infra Appendix A § 2-102(b)(1)-(4) (outlining the order in which the rules should be
applied in order to determine an entity's principal place of business).
262. See infra id. § 2-102(b)(1).
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of 200 workers at its Fulton County treatment facility, because the
District had its principal office in Cook County.263 Under the proposed
rule, however, both Cook County and Fulton County would be proper
venues, because the places of business in both counties would meet the
fifty-worker test.264 The District, in other words, would have to defend
suits in the same counties as a private business that had a Cook County
headquarters and a 200-worker place of business in Fulton County. 2 65
3. Legal Representative Defendant
Under the proposed rules, if the defendant is a legal representative,
venue would be based not on facts about the legal representative, but
The legal
rather on facts about the represented individual.266
representative of a minor or a legally disabled individual would be
"deemed located" in the county (or counties) where, at the time the suit
is filed, "the minor or legally disabled individual has a 'regular dwelling
place' or a 'regular work place."' 267 The legal representative of a
deceased individual's estate would be "deemed located" in the county
individual had a
(or counties) where, as of the time of death, "the
2 68
'regular dwelling place' or a 'regular work place."'
The practical difference between the proposed legal representative
rule and the current rule is illustrated by the factual scenario in
Precision Components, Inc. v. Estate of Kuntz. 2 69 In this Cook County
suit against the legal representative of a Kane County resident's estate,
Cook County was a proper venue because the executor-The Northern

App. Ct. 1979).
263. Cnty. of Fulton v. Prairie Plan Project, 399 N.E.2d 982, 984-85 (111.
264. See infra Appendix A § 2-102(b)(1).
265. In addition to the change discussed in the text, the proposal would delete sentences in the
current statute that prevent use of transaction-based venue in certain suits related to an airport
owned by a unit of local government. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-103(a) (2010) ("Except as
otherwise provided in Section 7-102 of this Code, any cause of action that is related to an airport
owned by a unit of local government, and that is pending on or after the effective date of this
amendatory Act of the 93rd General Assembly in a county other than the county in which the unit
of local government's principal office is located, shall be transferred, upon motion of any party
under Section 2-106 of this Code, to the county in which the unit of local government's principal
office is located.").
266. See infra Appendix A § 2-102(c) ("The legal representative of a minor or a legally
disabled individual is deemed located where, at the time the suit is filed, the minor or the legally
disabled individual has a 'regular dwelling place' or a 'regular work place' (see paragraph (a)).
The legal representative of a deceased individual's estate is deemed located where, as of the time
of death, the deceased individual had a 'regular dwelling place' or a 'regular work place' (see
paragraph (a)).").
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. 445 N.E.2d 449 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
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Trust Company-resided in Cook County. 270 Under the proposed legal
representative rule, however, Kane County would be the proper venue
because the executor would be "deemed located" in Kane County based
on the deceased individual's regular dwelling place in that county as of
the time of his death.2 7 1
Ordinarily, legal representatives are chosen based on factors such as a
family relationship or expertise in managing trusts and estates. 272 In the
past, however, legal representatives have been chosen for their effect on
where litigation will occur-i.e., whether it will occur in federal court,
based on diversity of citizenship, or in state court, for lack of
diversity. 273 The proposed legal representative rule would prevent
similar manipulation of venue.
4. Multiple Defendants
Under the proposed rules, if the suit is against multiple defendants,
venue would be proper in the county (or counties) where "the greatest
number of defendants is located." 274 The previously described rules for
individuals, legal entities, and legal representatives would identify the
county (or counties) where each defendant is located.275 Then, four
"counting rules" would determine venue based on where the greatest
number of defendants is located.276
First, a defendant would be considered for venue purposes ("count")
if, and only if, the defendant "was sued in compliance with Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 137.",277 This counting requirement would borrow
Rule 137's familiar standards, and would require that the claim against
each defendant be (i) based on reasonable inquiry, (ii) well grounded in
270. Id at 450.
271. See infra Appendix A
against a legal representative).

§ 2-102(c) (identifying the venue for an action brought by or

272. See Choosing the Executor or Trustee, AM. BAR. ASS'N, at 1-3, http://www.american

bar.org/content/dam/=aba/migrated/publiced/practical/books/wills/chapterI 0.authcheckdam.pdf
(last visited Apr. 19, 2012) (reviewing pros and cons of choosing a family member or an
institutional fiduciary as executor).
273. See Mullenix, supra note 100, at 1026 (noting that some litigants have admitted that they
intentionally appointed a representative for the purposes of securing federal jurisdiction).
274. See infra Appendix A § 2-101(a) ("Venue is proper in the county (or counties) where the
greatest number of defendants is located."). Indiana has a similar venue provision stating that
"preferred venue" lies in "the county where the greater percentage of individual defendants
included in the complaint resides, or, if there is no such greater percentage, the place where any
individual defendant so named resides." IND. TR. PRO. R. 75(A)(1).
275. Infra Appendix A § 2-102(a)-(c).
276. Infra id. § 1-102(d).
277. See infra id § 2-102(d)(1) ("A defendant counts if, and only if, it was sued in compliance
with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137.").
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fact, (iii) warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for
changing it, and (iv) made with no improper purpose such as
harassment. 278
Second, a defendant would count "in each county where it is
located."279 In essence, each county's total would indicate the number
of defendants that can conveniently defend suits in the county.
Third, a dismissal-voluntary or involuntary-would "not change
whether a defendant counts." 280 If a dismissed defendant were sued in
compliance with Rule 137, that defendant would have counted before
the dismissal and still would count afterward. If a dismissed defendant
were sued in violation of Rule 137, that defendant never would have
counted and still would not count. This counting rule would solve the
voluntary dismissal settlement problem discussed earlier.28 1 By
removing the threat that a voluntary dismissal might lead to transfer to a
non-preferred county, the rule would ensure that venue considerations
never would stand in the way of settlement.
Fourth, in case of a tie between counties for the greatest number of
defendants, "each such county" would be deemed a county where the
greatest number of defendants is located.282 For example, in a suit
against two defendants, one located in one county, the other located in
another county, both counties would be proper venues.
The proposed greatest number of defendants rule and these counting
rules would solve the group convenience problem, which was illustrated
by the Cook County suit against the McHenry County hospital, surgeon,
and surgical group in Gundlach v. Lind.2 8 3 Cook County was a proper
venue under the current any-defendant rule because the hospital's parent
corporation owned a behavioral health facility in Cook County.2 8 4 The
278. ILL. S. CT. R. 137. This cross-reference to Rule 137 likely would not change the law,
because the current good faith requirement has objective and subjective elements that overlap
with Rule 137's requirements. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101 (2010) (identifying Rule 137
requirements); supra text accompanying notes 105-12 (discussing requirements of good faith
joinder under current venue statute).
279. See infra Appendix A § 2-102(d)(2) ("A defendant counts in each county where it is
located.").
280. See infra id. § 2-102(d)(3) ("A dismissal-voluntary or involuntary-does not change
whether a defendant counts.").
281. See supra text accompanying note 113 (discussing the current voluntary dismissal rule's
deterrent effect on settlement with the defendant used to fix venue).
282. See infra Appendix A § 2-102(d)(4) ("In case of a tie between counties for the greatest
number of defendants, each such county is deemed a county where the greatest number of
defendants are located.").
283. 820 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
284. Id. at 5-6. Venue was proper in Cook County under the rule that venue is proper where
any defendant resides and the rule that a corporation resides (among other places) where it has an
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suit arrived in McHenry County only after time-consuming and costly
intrastate forum non conveniens litigation. 285 Under the proposed rule,
however, McHenry County would be the proper venue because it would
have the greatest number of defendants. 2 86 No intrastate forum non
conveniens litigation would occur.
The proposed rule would not stop the plaintiff from filing one suit
against the hospital and a second suit against the surgeon and surgical
group. In the suit against the hospital, both McHenry County and Cook
County would be proper venues because the hospital's parent
corporation would be included in each county's count of defendants. 287
As a result, the plaintiff could choose to sue the hospital in Cook
County and the remaining defendants in McHenry County. Filing two
suits instead of one has two negative effects, however, which would
discourage plaintiffs from resorting to it: (1) it raises the plaintiff's cost
of litigation, and (2) it lets the defendants use the empty-chair defense
and avoid infighting at trial.2 88 Moreover, the hospital suit likely would
be transferred to McHenry County. In the Cook County suit against all
three defendants, the Appellate Court held that the argument for transfer
to McHenry County was so compelling that denying the transfer was an
abuse of discretion. 289 This already-compelling argument would gain
added force when the transfer of a separate suit against the hospital
would enable this suit to be consolidated with the surgeon-surgical
group suit.
B. Transaction-BasedVenue

The proposal for transaction-based venue would make venue proper
in the county (or counties) where "the transaction occurred that gave

"other office." 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101-102(a) (2010).
285. Gundlach v. Lind, 820 N.E.2d 1, 5-6 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
286. The hospital and the surgical group both would be located in McHenry Countyassuming, of course, that these legal entities had no presence in another county that would meet a
higher-ranked presence test. See infra Appendix § 2-102(b) ("A legal entity . . . is located in the
county (or counties) identified by the following presence tests applied in the specified order.").
The surgeon also would be located in McHenry County under the regular work place rule. See
infra id. § 2-102(a) ("An individual is located in the county (or counties) where the individual has
a . . . regular work place."). Only the hospital would be located in Cook County under the
proposed rules quoted here-assuming, again, that the places of business maintained by the
parent corporation in these two counties would meet the same presence test.
287. See Gundlach, 820 N.E.2d at 5 (applying the proposed rules to each defendant).
288. See Hon. William J. Haddad, Sole Proximate Cause: The "Empty Chair" Defense in

Illinois, 99 ILL. B.J. 152, 153 (2011) (explaining the "empty chair" defense, i.e., that a person or
party other than the defendant is the sole proximate cause of an alleged injury).
289. Gundlach, 820 N.E.2d at 5.
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rise to the cause of action." 290 The proposal, unlike the current statute,
would delineate the limits of a transaction. The transaction would be
deemed to have occurred "where any matter occurred that the plaintiff
has the burden of proving." 29 1 The burden-of-proof test would ensure,
as it always has, that venue can serve the convenience of the witnesses.
Based on other policies identified in the next two paragraphs, however,
the use of this test would be limited in two ways.
First, the proposal states that "venue cannot be based on the accrual
of an expense claimed as money damages." 292 This money-damages
limitation would preserve the already recognized last-event rule. 293
Without this limitation, the plaintiffs attorney in a tort action could
pick a favorable county in which to sue, arrange for the plaintiff to
receive some medical treatment there, add the cost of this arranged-for
treatment to the damages claim, and base venue on the arranged-for
treatment.
Second, a proposed special venue provision for suits by businesses
against consumers states that, if the suit is "brought by a business
against a consumer who was physically present in the State for part or
all of the transaction," venue cannot be based on "a matter that did not
involve the consumer's physical presence." 294 For example, a
consumer and a business might enter into a contract over the telephone
while they are in different counties. In a suit brought by the business to
enforce this oral contract, the business, as the plaintiff, has the burden of
proving that the consumer offered to purchase the business's product or
service, and that the business accepted the offer. Yet, venue would only
be proper where the consumer was physically present, which is the
290. See infra Appendix A § 2-101(b) ("Venue is proper in the county (or counties) where the
transaction occurred that gave rise to the cause of action.").
291. See infra id. § 2-102.1 ("The transaction that gave rise to the cause of action is deemed to
have occurred where any matter occurred that the plaintiff has the burden of proving, except as
limited by paragraphs (a)-(b).").
292. See infra id. § 2-102.1(a) ("Venue cannot be based on the accrual of an expense claimed
as money damages.").
293. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing the last event rule). The last
event rule would make venue proper where the victim suffers injury or dies, because each would
be the last act required to create liability for personal injury or wrongful death, but the rule would
make venue improper where the victim received treatment and incurred expense claimed as
money damages, because such acts would occur after the last act required to create liability. Id.
294. See infra Appendix A § 2-103(g) ("In an action brought by a business against a consumer
who was physically present in the State for part or all of the transaction, venue cannot be based on
a matter that did not involve the consumer's physical presence. A 'business' is an individual or a
legal entity that sells, leases, lends, or enters into a transaction in the ordinary course of the
individual's or legal entity's trade or business. A 'consumer' is an individual who buys, leases,
borrows, or enters into a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.").
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location where the offer was made. The consumer was not physically
present where the business accepted the consumer's offer. 295
The proposed transaction-based venue rule-with its burden-of-proof
test and above limitations-would solve two problems. First, it would
solve the indirect dealings problem illustrated by the Madison County
lawsuit brought against a Michigan car manufacturer in Boxdorfer v.
DaimlerChryslerCorp., which accused the car manufacturer of failing
to disclose a defect that caused paint to delaminate from its cars after
the warranty expired. 296 Paint delamination had occurred in Madison
County on cars sold by Madison County dealers, but Madison County
was not a proper venue because no dealings had taken place there
between the car buyers and the manufacturer.2 9 7 Under the proposed
burden-of-proof test, however, Madison County would be a proper
venue, because the plaintiff car buyers had the burden of proving the
Madison County deceptions and losses. 2 98 The suit would be heard in
Madison County, a county that had witnesses, and not in another county
with no witnesses.
Second, the burden-of-proof test would end the confusion created by
the Illinois Appellate Court's use of multiple transaction-based venue
tests. In some decisions, the Appellate Court has used the burden-ofproof test; in others, it has used the party-dealings test. 2 99 The proposed
295. The consumer protection policy underlying this special provision for suits by businesses
against consumers is similar to the policy that underlies a special venue provision that, in actions
against insurance companies, makes venue proper in the county in which the plaintiff (or one of
the plaintiffs) resides. See Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Manasherov, 558 N.E.2d 543, 547 (Il. App.
Ct. 1990) (relying on the public policy of consumer protection in upholding the forum non
conveniens transfer of an insurance company's declaratory judgment action against the policy
holder regarding a disputed medical expense claim, from the county where the insurance
company had its headquarters and received the application and initial premium, to the county
where the policyholder dealt with the independent broker who allegedly acted as the insurance
company's agent in making certain alleged statements about the policy's effective date). A
similar consumer protection policy underlies the earlier-discussed decision in Williams v. Ill.
State Scholarship Comm'n, 563 N.E.2d 465 (Ill. 1990).

There, the Illinois Supreme Court

protected student borrowers from a state agency's practice of filing loan collection suits in a
county where the loan-related acts did not involve the borrowers' physical presence. Id. at 47576, 485. The proposed special venue provision would extend the same protection, for the same
reason, to all consumers in all suits brought by businesses. See infra Appendix A § 2-103(g).
Some businesses might try to change the proper venue by using a forum selection clause, but the
clause would have to meet requirements for forum selection clauses. See Williams, 563 N.E.2d at
487 (discussing requirements for forum selection clauses).
296. 790 N.E.2d 391, 398-99 (111. App. Ct. 2003).
297. Id.
298. Infra Appendix A § 2-102.1. For further discussion about the plaintiff's burden of proof
in a consumer fraud claim, see supra note 174 and accompanying text.
299. See supra part LB; supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text (applying party-dealings
test to find that venue was not proper in Cook County because both parties did not transact with
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rule resolves this conflict in favor of the burden-of-proof test, with the
two above-described limitations.
This resolution of the conflict would have changed the result reached
in the collection suit against the Ogle County gasoline station dealer in
American Oil Co. v. Mason,30 0 where the use of the party-dealings test
made Ogle County the only place where transaction-based venue was
proper. 301 Under the proposed rule's burden-of-proof test, both Ogle
County and Cook County would be places where transaction-based
venue is proper. Because the persons who knew about the loan, the
payment record, and the default were divided between the two counties,
both counties would serve the convenience of the witnesses as a group
to about the same extent. Both counties should be proper venues, and
would be under the burden-of-proof test.
Even the proposed transaction-based venue rule would not solve the
problem that can occur when venue is based solely on part of the
transaction, which was illustrated in Wier ex rel. Wier v. Ketterer.302
Recall that part of the plaintiff's medical treatment had occurred inside
the ambulance, which passed through St. Clair County on the way from
Clinton County to St. Louis. But other than the occupants of the
ambulance, no other persons along the route could have seen the care
provided inside the ambulance, which the plaintiff alleged was
negligently supervised by the defendant doctor. Therefore, most of the
occurrence witnesses likely to testify were medical personnel in Clinton
County. 303 The convenience of these witnesses was not served by
letting the plaintiff sue in St. Clair County, instead of requiring the
plaintiff to sue in Clinton County-though admittedly the burden of
traveling between these adjacent counties is rather small and, indeed,
some medical personnel who work in Clinton County might live in St.
Clair County. Under the proposed rule, both counties would remain
proper venues because the plaintiff has the burden of proving the
negligence and the injuries, which had occurred cumulatively in both
counties. 30 4 As before, the plaintiff could sue in St. Clair County.
If all suits based on cumulative negligence and cumulative injuries
had the same witness location pattern as the ambulance transfer suit, the
each other in Cook County).
300. 273 N.E.2d 17 (111. App. Ct. 1971).
301. Residence-based venue was proper in DeKalb County. Id. at 17.
302. 479 N.E.2d 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
303. As noted before, the occurrence witnesses in St. Louis could not be compelled to testify
in Illinois. See supra note 27 (discussing which witnesses cannot be compelled to testify in
Illinois).
304. Infra Appendix A § 2-102.1.
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proposed rule could be modified to solve the part of the transaction
problem. Specifically, the rule could limit venue to the first county in
which the negligence and the injuries occurred. Yet, this first-county
limitation often would not match the witness location pattern. For
305 a recent venue decision by the
example, in Kaiser v. Doll-Pollard,
Appellate Court, the surgery that had occurred in Clinton County had
been followed by post-operative surgery in St. Clair County to stop
internal bleeding, with the negligence and the injuries again having
occurred cumulatively in both counties. 306 This time, however, both
counties had witnesses to parts of the care, so the first-county limitation
would not match the likely witness location pattern. 307 In a
hypothetical variation of the ambulance transfer suit, if a St. Clair
County-based ambulance picked up an accident victim in Clinton
County and took the victim to a hospital in St. Clair County, the
mismatch has the potential to be even worse. In that variation, all of the
witnesses who either saw the care inside the ambulance or supervised it
likely would be located, not in the first county (Clinton), but in the
second county (St. Clair).
The suit-to-suit variation in witness location patterns makes it
impossible to draft a venue rule that would (1) always make venue
proper where the witnesses are located, but (2) never give the plaintiff a
venue option that could create a witness inconvenience problem. The
burden-of-proof test best meets the first objective of always making
venue proper where the witnesses are located, and it lets the court
consider any witness inconvenience problem, along with other private
interest factors and public interest factors, 308 in deciding whether to
305. 923 N.E.2d 927 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
306. See id. at 929-30.

307. Because the circuit court addressed only the venue question and the parties had not
conductedforum non conveniens discovery, id., the decision does not indicate which occurrence
witnesses were likely to testify and where these likely witnesses lived and worked. Logically,
however, the medical personnel who treated the plaintiff in Clinton County worked in Clinton
County and most of them probably also lived in this county, while the medical personnel who
treated the plaintiff in St. Clair County worked in St. Clair County and most of them probably
also lived in that county.
308. See First Am. Bank v. Guerine, 764 N.E.2d 54, 58 (Ill. 2002) (discussing the public
interest and private interest factors that a court must consider before granting a motion to transfer
venue on the basis of intrastate forum non conveniens). Under guidance from the Illinois
Supreme Court:
[T]he private interest factors include (1) the convenience of the parties; (2) the relative
ease of access to sources of testimonial, documentary, and real evidence; and (3) all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensivefor example, the availability of compulsory process to secure attendance of unwilling
witnesses, the cost to obtain attendance of willing witnesses, and the ability to view the
premises (if appropriate). The public interest factors include (1) the interest in
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grant an intrastate forum non conveniens transfer. 309 If, on the other
hand, the narrower party-dealings test had been used, that test
sometimes would fail to make venue proper where the witnesses are
located, and it would prevent the court from remedying the witness
inconvenience problem because the court cannot transfer a suit to an
improper venue. 310
C. Any-County Venue
The any-county venue proposal would make all Illinois counties
proper venues if (1) defendant-based venue is not proper in any county,
and (2) transaction-based venue is not proper in any county.31 1 This
proposal, in other words, would back up the other proposals and prevent
venue gaps, so there never could be a suit in which the Illinois courts
would have jurisdiction but there would be no proper venue.
Essentially, the plaintiff would have the unlimited choice of counties in
which to sue only when there is no county that would serve the
convenience of the defendant and also no county that would serve the
convenience of the witnesses.
deciding localized controversies locally; (2) the unfairness of imposing the expense of
a trial and the burden of jury duty on residents of a county with little connection to the
litigation; and (3) the administrative difficulties presented by adding further litigation
to court dockets in already congested fora.
Id. (internal citations omitted). The court will apply the same factors when considering an
interstate forum non conveniens motion to transfer venue to out of Illinois. See Laverty v. CSX
Transp., Inc., 956 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) ("The rationale underlying the doctrine
offorum non conveniens 'is as valid on an intrastate [basis] as it is on an interstate basis."').
309. Although the concepts of proper venue and forum non conveniens share significant
overlap, they are fundamentally distinct. For example, this Article is primarily devoted to
providing a better way to determine which forum would be the proper venue to hear a case by
changing the statutory framework for establishing venue. Forum non conveniens is an equitable
doctrine that allows the court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over an action even if venue is
already proper under the venue statutes, when there is "another forum with proper jurisdiction
and venue 'would better serve the ends of justice."' Guerine, 764 N.E.2d at 57. Although courts
considering a motion to transfer or dismiss under forum non conveniens generally give the
plaintiff's choice of venue deference, courts also consider the interest that a different forum
would have in resolving the litigation and the interest of judicial administration. Id. To resolve
these questions, courts look to the factors outlined in Guerine. See supra note 308 and
accompanying text. Of course,forum non conveniens litigation is costly, especially in light of the
fact that it is rarely dispositive of the action; indeed, even if the motion is successful, the transfer
usually just prolongs the litigation. Therefore, a better set of rules that establish a limited number
of proper venues would serve the same interests as forum non conveniens without the need to
apply its list of factors and is precisely one of the goals of the rules proposed in this Article.
310. See Langenhorst v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 848 N.E.2d 927, 934 (Ill. 2006) (reiterating that a
suit can be transferred on the ground offorum non conveniens only if the other county is a proper
venue).
311. See infra Appendix A § 2-101(c) ("If there is no county where venue is proper under
paragraphs (a)-(b), venue is proper in any county.").
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The problem created by the current any-county rule was illustrated by
the hypothetical car accident suit against the Kentucky resident who
commuted to a job in Massac County.3 12 If the accident occurred in
Massac County, so transaction-based venue is proper there, the current
any-county rule still makes all Illinois counties proper venues simply
because the defendant is a nonresident. 3 13 The plaintiff can sue in Cook
County, for example, despite the obvious witness inconvenience
problem this choice creates. Under the proposed any-county rule,
however, the plaintiff would not have the unlimited choice of Illinois
counties when there is a county where transaction-based venue would
be proper. 314
D. Venue Procedure

The venue procedure proposal would amend the current procedure in
three ways. 315 First, the defendant would have the right to have a suit
transferred if "the addition of a new defendant changes the county (or
counties) with the greatest number of defendants." 3 1 6 This amendment
would block a sue-and-amend ploy. Without the amendment, the
plaintiffs attorney could identify a preferred county where some
defendants are located, sue just those defendants, use them to fix venue,
and then amend to add the rest of the defendants. With the amendment,
this ploy would fail.
Second, the defendant similarly would have the right to a transfer if
"the addition of a new cause of action requires severance and transfer
because venue is improper on the new cause of action." 317 This
amendment also would block another sue-and-amend ploy since,
without the amendment, the plaintiffs attorney could identify a
preferred county in which one of the plaintiffs causes of action arose,
312. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (setting forth the hypothetical).
313.

735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101 (2010).

314. See infra Appendix A § 2-101(c) ("If there is no county where venue is proper under
paragraphs (a)-(b), venue is proper in any county.").
315. In addition to the three amendments described in the text, a fourth amendment would
modify the section on costs and expenses of transfer to incorporate Illinois Supreme Court Rule
137 standards. Infra id. § 2-107.
316. See infra id. § 2-104(b)(2) ("A defendant waives all venue objections by failing to make
a timely motion to transfer the action to a proper venue. A 'timely' motion means a motion
made: . .. promptly, if the addition of a new defendant changes the county (or counties) with the
greatest number of defendants . . . ."). The requirement of a "prompt" motion is borrowed from
the current statute that, if the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the venue-fixing defendant, requires a
remaining defendant to move for transfer "promptly" or waive the venue objection. 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/2-104(b).

317. See infra Appendix A § 2-104(b)(3) (defining what constitutes a timely motion to
transfer venue).
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sue on just this cause of action, use it to fix venue, and then amend to
add the other causes of action. With the proposed amendment, this ploy
would fail.3 1 8
Third, the proposal would provide that, following the denial of a
motion to transfer, "no further step is required to preserve the venue
objections that were included in the motion." 319 The current
preservation rule is complicated and requires a further step. The current
rule applies when (1) the plaintiff relies on residence-based venue in a
suit against defendants that reside in different counties, (2) the court
denies a motion to transfer made by a defendant that does not reside in
the county, and (3) this defendant proceeds to trial on the merits and
then appeals. 320 The current rule states that, in order to use the denial of
the transfer motion as a ground for reversal, the defendant must renew
the motion at the close of all evidence. 32 1
This current rule implicitly assumes that something can happen
during the trial to change the venue transfer ruling-otherwise, no
Yet, the settled
purpose is served by renewing the motion.
interpretation of the current statute's good faith requirement rebuts such
an assumption because it effectively prevents the trial from changing
the venue ruling. If the plaintiff introduces no evidence against the
defendant who was used to fix venue, the court neither finds that the
defendant was joined in bad faith nor reverses an earlier transfer
ruling. 322 Instead, the court presumes this failure of proof results from

318. The second amendment is less important than the first amendment because plaintiffs join
truly distinct causes of action in relatively few suits. In claim preclusion law, the Illinois
Supreme Court treats two claims as different causes of action only if the claims arise out of
different transactions. River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 703 N.E.2d 883, 893 (Ill. 1998).
The transaction test relies on pragmatic factors, such as whether the claims are related in time
space, origin, or motivation; whether they form a convenient trial unit; and whether their
treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding. Id. (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 24

(1982)).

If the plaintiff has several claims based

on different legal theories, these claims often count as a single cause of action rather than two
causes of action. Id.
319. See infra Appendix A § 2-105 ("Following the denial of a motion to transfer, no further
step is required to preserve for appeal the venue objections that were included in the motion.").
320. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-105.

321. Id. The statute does not indicate what step a defendant must take if the plaintiff is not
relying on residence-based venue or the suit is not against multiple defendants. Id.
322. See Novak v. Thies, 412 N.E.2d 666, 668 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (rejecting the argument by
the defendant motorcycle driver and the defendant car driver-that the defendant motorcycle
manufacturer must have been joined in bad faith since the plaintiff motorcycle passenger's estate
introduced no evidence at trial establishing the manufacturer's liability-because this failure to
introduce evidence "could have been the result of a flexible trial strategy" that depended on the
testimony elicited).
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the plaintiffs "flexible trial strategy." 323 Because the current renewal
requirement serves no purpose other than to add needless effort and cost
to litigation, this third proposed procedure amendment would eliminate
it.

III. THE ANTI-FORUM SHOPPING PROPOSAL

This Part offers a proposal that would curb forum shopping employed
by both sides in higher-value personal injury suits. In these suits, the
previously described convenience-based proposals often would give the
parties fewer venue options than they have under Illinois's general
venue statute. Yet, because both sides still would expect the results of
litigation to vary significantly among the counties that would remain
proper venues, the incentive to forum shop might not be significantly
reduced. Logically, the incentive to forum shop depends to a large
extent on the number of available venues; the more proper venues that
exist, the more likely the parties can find a forum that maximizes the
possible outcome for their side. Ideally, in order to curb forum
shopping, proper venue would be limited to one county, although the
proposed rules recognize that there are some occasions when more than
one proper venue is justified and the incentive to forum shop is still
relatively low.
The proposal offered here would produce this pattern by limiting
venue to the county (or counties) with the most significant connection to
the occurrence and the parties. This "most significant connection test"
is patterned on the most significant relationship test that Illinois courts
currently use to resolve conflict of laws issues. 324 Thus, this Part
explains (a) why the use of the most significant connection test would
be appropriate, (b) what it would require, and (c) how it would curb
forum shopping. Appendix B sets forth the proposal.3 2 5
A. The Rationale
The anti-forum shopping proposal would apply in suits for injury to
the person or wrongful death that "seek money damages exceeding the
amount specified in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 222."326 Rule 222
323. Id.
324. Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 N.E.2d 893, 898, 901 (Ill. 2007).
325. See generally infra Appendix B (outlining the proposed anti-forum shopping rules
associated with Part III).
326. See infra id. § 2-102.2 ("This special venue statute applies to all actions for injury to the
person or wrongful death that seek money damages exceeding the amount specified in Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 222. In these actions, venue is proper in the county (or counties) with the
greatest connection to the occurrence and the parties according to paragraphs (a)--(d).").
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specifies $50,000 in damages exclusive of interest and costs as the
dividing line between (1) the lower-value suits to which its limited and
simplified discovery procedures apply, and (2) the higher-value suits to
which the general rules governing discovery apply. 327 Under Rule 222,
a party must attach to its initial pleading in any civil action seeking
money damages an affidavit stating whether the total of money damages
sought "does or does not exceed $50,000.",328 Based on this Rule 222
affidavit, therefore, it would be clear whether the proposed rule would
or would not determine venue.
The forum shopping that occurs in these suits is due, as noted before,
to county-to-county differences in juries and judges, which cause
county-to-county variations in verdicts and judgments. In counties
where the community judgment favors greater tort liability, the plaintiff
anticipates better odds of victory and a larger victory. In counties where
the community judgment favors less tort liability, the defendant
anticipates lower odds of defeat or a smaller defeat. 329
Because the law's practical meaning-how the law operates in effect,
not just in theory-depends not just on legal rules but on the results
reached when legal rules are applied, this variation in verdicts and
judgments indicates that the law's practical meaning varies from county
to county. Thus, as a practical matter, there is not solely Illinois law,
there is also "Cook County law," "Madison County law," "Du Page
County law," and so forth. Each county's socioeconomic characteristics
affect how juries and judges exercise their discretion in applying Illinois
tort law, and the end result is that each county acts as though it has a
somewhat distinct tort law. Venue essentially determines which
county's law applies.
Since venue is often selected for the effect it will have on the
outcome of the case, much in the same way as the plaintiff selects the
state in which to sue based on tort law differences that can lead to a
favorable result, it makes sense to look to conflict-of-laws principles for
ways to curb forum shopping. When suits have connections with more
than one state and these states have conflicting laws, Illinois courts
resolve the conflict by applying the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of

327. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 222(a) (providing exceptions for small claims, ordinance violations,
actions based on family law, and actions seeking equitable relief). Because the proposal would
borrow Rule 222's dividing line, its coverage would shift in tandem with any amendments to
Rule 222 that move this dividing line upward.
328. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 222(b).
329. See supra text accompanying note 7 (discussing the reasons for forum shopping and
citing authorities that discuss this litigation tactic).
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Laws. 330 For conflicts about issues of tort law, the Second Restatement
calls for application of the law of the state that, with respect to the issue,
has the "most significant relationship" to the occurrence and the
parties. 33 1 This state is chosen in two steps: (1) jurisdiction-selecting
rules identify a state as the presumptive choice, and (2) this choice is
tested by applying choice of law factors and the tort law list of
contacts. 332
The first step is easy. Under the jurisdiction-selecting rules for
personal injury and wrongful death suits, the presumptive choice is the
state where the injury occurred. 333 This presumption is a weaker
version of the old rule that tort issues are governed by the law of the
place of the wrong (lex loci delicti).33 4 The presumption is justified,
according to the Illinois Supreme Court, because the law of the state
where the injury occurred reflects the balance of competing substantive
interests struck by the community whose members are most likely to
become involved in accidents in the state.335
The second step--testing the presumptive choice-is complex. In
personal injury suits, this testing process takes into account three policyoriented choice of law factors: (1) the relevant policies of the forum; (2)
the relevant policies of other interested states and their relative interests
in the determination of the particular issue; and (3) the basic policies
underlying the particular field of law. 336 The Second Restatement calls
for "the best possible accommodation" of state policies. 337 The Illinois
Supreme Court has said that rules that impose tort liability and rules that
limit tort liability "are entitled to the same consideration." 338
330. See Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 879 N.E.2d 893, 898 (Ill. 2007) (citing the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws). Townsend cites many of the Supreme Court and
Appellate Court decisions that have relied on the Second Restatement. Id at 899-907. Townsend
is now the decision commonly relied on by Illinois courts in tort cases that raise conflict of laws
issues. See, e.g., Banks v. Ribco, Inc., 933 N.E.2d 867, 869-73 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (citing
Townsend repeatedly); Quaid v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 910 N.E.2d 1236, 1250-51 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2009) (relying on Townsend to determine which state's tort law would apply, which was
relevant to aforum non conveniens ruling).

331. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
RESTATEMENT].

§ 145(1) (1971) [hereinafter SECOND

332. Townsend, 879 N.E.2d at 903.
333. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 331, §§ 146, 175.
334. Townsend, 879 N.E.2d at 899, 904 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 377-78 (1934)).
335. Id. (quoting Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842, 844-45 (7th Cir. 1999)).
336. Townsend, 879 N.E.2d at 906-07 (citing SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 331, §
6(2)(b), (c), (e)).
337. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 331, § 6 cmt. f.
338. Townsend, 879 N.E.2d at 907 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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The testing process also takes into account the four contacts listed for
tort law: (1) the place where the injury occurred; (2) the place where the
conduct causing the injury occurred; (3) the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties;
and (4) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered. 339 The testing process might indicate the injury state has a
less significant relationship to the occurrence and to the parties than a
state with other such contacts.
This is most likely to occur when all the parties have the same
domicile, for then the "party" contacts often have more significance
than the "place of injury" contact. 340 Among courts that have
abandoned the lex loci delicti rule, the judicial practice of applying the
common domicile state's law instead of the injury state's law has gained
ground steadily-so much ground that a leading conflict of laws scholar
has said, "one can speak of the emergence of a true common-domicile
rule." 341 The Illinois decisions support this scholar's statement about
judicial practice. 342
At the core of the common-domicile rule is the idea that individuals
who live in the same community implicitly agree to a social contract.
As the social contract is described by one court, an individual "assents
to casting her lot with others in accepting burdens as well as benefits of
identification with a particular community."34 3 The individual cedes to
339.

SECOND RESTATEMENT, supranote 331,

§ 145(2).

340. This is not to say that this is the only context in which the testing process may indicate
that the injury state has a less significant relationship to the occurrence and parties. A second
circumstance arises when the conflict involves a tort rule designed to deter certain conduct, and
thus the "place of conduct" contact sometimes has greater than usual significance. See Townsend,
879 N.E.2d. at 908-09 (citing SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 331,

§

146 cmt. c, e) (noting

that there is "better reason" to think the state of conduct is the state of dominant interest in this
circumstance). Just as the community judgment of the injury state seems to deserve priority when
tort law seeks to compensate victims for injury, the community judgment of the conduct state
seems to deserve priority when tort law seeks to deter conduct. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra
note 331, § 146 cmt. c, e. The Second Restatement warns, however, not to give too much
emphasis to this point. Id. Most tort rules, it notes, have both compensatory and deterrent
purposes. Id.
341.

Symeon C. Symeonides, Oregon's New Choice-of-Law Codificationfor Tort Conflicts:

An Exegesis, 88 OR. L. REv. 963, 1001 (2009).
342. Esser v. McIntyre, 661 N.E.2d 1138, 1141-44 (111.1996) (reasoning that the duty issue
was governed by the law of common domicile); Miller v. Hays, 600 N.E.2d 34, 36-39 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1992) (reasoning that the wrongful death damage limit issue was governed by the law of
common domicile); Nelson v. Hix, 522 N.E.2d 1214, 1217-18 (Ill. 1988) (reasoning that the
spousal immunity issue was governed by the law of marital domicile); Ingersoll v. Klein, 262
N.E.2d 593, 595-97 (Ill. 1970) (reasoning that the wrongful death action was governed by the
law of common domicile).
343. Collins v. Trius, 663 A.2d 570, 573 (Me. 1995) (reasoning that the law of common
domicile applied to limit damages for non-pecuniary losses).
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community lawmaking agencies "the authority to make judgments
striking the balance between her private substantive interests and
competing ones of other members of the community." 344 Under the
common-domicile rule, the community judgment of the state common
to all of the parties trumps the community judgment of the injury state.
The above-described features of the Second Restatement guide the
proposal offered here. Under this proposal, the proper venue would be
determined by a "most significant connection" test.345 Just as the "most
significant relationship" test tilts neither toward tort rules that impose
greater tort liability nor toward tort rules that impose less tort liability,
the "most significant connection" test would tilt neither toward counties
where the community judgment favors greater tort liability nor toward
counties where the community judgment favors less tort liability.
B. The Most Significant Connection Test
The proposed most significant connection test would focus on four
questions: (1) Do the parties belong to the same community in Illinois;
(2) did the injury occur somewhere in Illinois; (3) did the conduct that
caused the injury occur somewhere in Illinois; and (4) if the answers to
the previous three questions are "no," what default rule should apply?
The search for the county (or counties) with the greatest connection
would proceed step by step through these questions. These rules
recognize that certain sets of facts make it more likely that a particular
venue will have the most significant connection to the lawsuit and
establish priority accordingly.
1. Same Community
The first question-whether the parties belong to the same
community in Illinois-would be asked using the location terminology
used in Part 11.346 A "common location" would be a county where "all
plaintiffs and all defendants were located when the transaction occurred
that gave rise to the cause of action." 347 The previously-described
344. Id.
345. Infra Appendix B § 2-102.2.
346. See supra Part II.A (discussing the location rules for defendant-based venue).
347. See infra Appendix B § 2-102.2(a) ("A 'common location' is a county where all
plaintiffs and all defendants were located when the transaction occurred that gave rise to the cause
of action. The location rules of § 2-102(a)-(c) determine a party's location, except these rules are
applied to the facts at the time of the transaction. If a county meets the common location
requirement, this county has the greatest connection to the occurrence and the parties and venue is
proper in this county. If more than one county meets the common location requirement, each
such county has the greatest connection to the occurrence and the parties and venue is proper in
each such county.").
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location rules3 4 8 would determine the location of all individuals, legal
entities, and legal representatives. These location rules would apply,
however, to "the facts at the time of the transaction." 349
This timing feature is borrowed from choice of law decisions.
According to a leading decision on the timing issue, domicile should be
determined at the time of the accident so the plaintiff cannot change the
applicable law via a post-accident change of domicile. 350 The
proposal's common-location rule similarly would apply to the facts at
the time of the transaction so the plaintiff could not change the proper
venue via a post-transaction change of location.
The plaintiff and the defendant could have a common location in
various ways. For example, if the plaintiff had her regular dwelling
place in County A and her regular work place in County B, and the
defendant had both his regular dwelling place and his regular work
place in County B, these two parties would have a common location in
County B. If the plaintiff instead sued a corporation that had multiple
places of business, including one in County B that would meet the fiftyworker test, these two parties also would have a common location in
County B. If that corporation also had a place of business in County A
that would meet the fifty-worker test, these two parties would have a
common location in County A, in addition to their common location in
County B.
The proposed common-location rule would give priority to the
common-location county's community judgment in almost the same
way that the common-domicile rule gives priority to the community
judgment of the common domicile state.3 51 In two ways, however, the
proposed rule's scope would be broader than the common-domicile
rule.

348. Infra Appendix A § 2-102(a)-(c).
349. Infra Appendix B

§ 2-102.2(a).

350. Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 730 (Cal. 1967) (determining domicile at the time of the
accident on which the suit was based). The law is not uniform on this point. See PETER HAY,
PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 825-26 nn.8-9 (5th ed.

2010). The Second Restatement states that a post-accident change of domicile "presumably ...
should have no effect" upon the applicable law with most issues, but it concedes that the change
might have some effect on some issues. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 331, Intro. Note on
Torts cmt. 2. The Second Restatement concludes the existing authority is "too sparse" for it to
address the problem. Id.
351. See Esser v. McIntyre, 661 N.E.2d 1138, 1141-44 (Ill. 1996) (holding that-in a suit
between two individuals who were domiciled in Illinois and traveled to Mexico together-the
legal duty owed by the individual who allegedly spilled popcorn kernels on the hotel floor to the
individual who allegedly was hurt when these kernels caused her to slip and fall is governed by
Illinois law rather than Mexican law).
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First, the proposed common-location rule would use a broader
measure of community membership than the common-domicile rule.
Referring back to an example discussed above, the plaintiff who had her
regular dwelling place in County A had a different county domicile than
the defendant who had his regular dwelling place in County B. Yet, by
having a regular work place in County B, the plaintiff had cast her lot in
a substantial way with other persons located in County B. When she
sues that County B defendant, their shared acceptance of County B's
burdens and benefits would make it fair to determine tort liability
according to County B's community judgment.
Second, the common-location rule would not include exceptions
comparable to the exceptions that some courts have recognized to the
common-domicile rule.3 52 For example, some courts distinguish
between "loss-allocating" tort rules, which seek to compensate, and
"conduct-regulating" tort rules, which seek to deter. 35 3 According to
these courts, the common-domicile rule applies to conflicts between
loss-allocating rules, but not to conflicts between conduct-regulating
rules. 3 54 A similar conduct-regulation exception was not included in the
proposal, partly because it would let forum shopping continue while
Illinois courts sorted out which tort rules are conduct-regulating. 355 The
exception also was not included because it is based on an issue-by-issue
approach to conflict of laws that is incompatible with venue law. 356 For
example, in a suit that involves a conflict between loss-allocating rules
on one issue, and between conduct-regulating rules on a second issue,
courts that recognize the conduct-regulation exception will apply the
352. The common-domicile rule's proper scope is the subject of ongoing debate. See
Symeonides, supra note 341, at 1001-03 (discussing five ways in which the rule has been defined
based on different philosophical assumptions and biases in favor of forum law, the law that favors
recovery, or both).
353. Id. Dean Symeonides describes the distinction between conduct-regulating and lossallocating as follows: (1) conduct-regulating rules are "designed to primarily deter or regulate
conduct by declaring certain substandard conduct to be tortious," and (2) loss-allocating rules are
"primarily designed to allocate between parties the losses caused by admittedly tortious conduct."
Id. at 1008-09.
354. See id. at 1009 ("Admittedly, the line between the two categories is not always very
bright. ... [T]here are many tort rules that do not easily fit in either category, and some rules that
appear to fit in both categories because they may both regulate conduct and affect loss
distribution.").
355. See id. (reviewing judicial and legislative efforts to give specific content to the
distinction).
356. See id. at 1007-08 (citing Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284-85 (N.Y. 1963))
(discussing Babcock v. Jackson, the famous case in which the New York Court of Appeals
applied New York law on the guest-host issue while it acknowledged that it would have applied
Ontario law to an issue related either to the manner in which the defendant had been driving his
car at the time of the accident or to the defendant's exercise of due care).
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common-domicile state's law to the first issue and the conduct state's
law to the second issue.3 57 Yet, it is impractical to hear a suit issue by
issue in different counties.
The proposal would translate the above points about community
judgment into venue rules. If one county is a common location for all
of the parties, "this county has the greatest connection to the occurrence
and the parties and venue is proper in this county."3 58 If more than one
county is a common location for all of the parties, "each such county
has the greatest connection to the occurrence and the parties and venue
is proper in each such county." 359 If no county meets the common
location requirement, however, the search for the county (or counties)
with the greatest connection would continue to the second step.
2. Place of Injury
If the answer to the first question is "no," the second question would
be whether the injury occurred somewhere in Illinois. A "place of
injury" would be a county where "the injury giving rise to the cause of
action occurred." 360 For wrongful death suits, the term would refer to a
county where "the injury was suffered that caused the death, not the
county where death occurred."361 In suits based on cumulative injuries,
more than one county could be a place of injury. For example, in the
case involving the transfer of the patient in an ambulance across county
lines, the negligently supervised treatment caused the patient to suffer
injuries that started in Clinton County and continued in St. Clair
County, 362 so both of these counties would meet the place of injury
requirement.
The proposed place-of-injury rule would give priority to the injurycounty's community judgment, second only to the priority that the
common-location rule would give to the common-location county's
community judgment. This second priority would resemble the priority
357. Id. at 1007-12.
358. Infra Appendix B § 2-102.2(a).
359. Infra id.

360. See infra id. §2-102.2(b) ("A 'place of injury' is a county where the injury giving rise to
the cause of action occurred. In a wrongful death suit, a 'place of injury' is a county where the
injury was suffered that caused the death, not the county where death occurred. If a county meets
the place of injury requirement, and no county meets the requirement of paragraph (a), this county
has the greatest connection to the occurrence and the parties and venue is proper in this county. If
more than one county meets the place of injury requirement, and no county meets the requirement
of paragraph (a), each such county has the greatest connection to the occurrence and the parties
and venue is proper in each such county.").
361.

Seeinfraid.

362. Wier ex rel. Wier v. Ketterer, 479 N.E.2d 416,416-17 (111. App. Ct. 1985).
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that the place of injury is given by Illinois courts in conflict of laws

decisions. 3 63
Thus, like the above rule that gives first priority to the county of
common location shared by the parties, the proposed rule giving second
priority to the county where the injury occurred continues to translate
the concept of community judgment into venue rules. If one county
meets the place of injury requirement, and no county meets the previous
common location requirement, "this county has the greatest connection
to the occurrence and the parties and venue is proper in this county." 364
If more than one county meets the place-of-injury requirement, and no
county meets the previous common-location requirement, "each such
county has the greatest connection to the occurrence and the parties and
venue is proper in each such county." 365 If no county meets the placeof-injury requirement, the search for the county (or counties) with the
greatest connection would continue to the third step.
3. Place of Conduct
The third question would be whether the conduct that caused the
injury occurred somewhere in Illinois. This question would be reached
only if the injury giving rise to the cause of action occurred outside of
Illinois-as would be true, for example, if a defective machine
manufactured in Illinois caused injury to a worker who was using the
machine in Indiana. A "place of conduct" would be a county where
"the acts or omissions giving rise to the cause of action occurred." 3 66 In
many suits, more than one county could be a place of conduct. For
example, if a manufacturer designed a product in one county and
363. Illinois courts follow the judicial practice known as the common-domicile rule, but they
also agree with the presumption in favor of the state of injury. See Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 879 N.E.2d 893, 903 (Ill. 2007) ("[A] presumption exists, which may be overcome only
by showing a more or greater significant relationship to another state."). This essentially means
that the proposed rank order for venue would reflect the rank order in Illinois conflict of laws
decisions. Just as the proposal does not have a conduct-regulation exception to venue based on
common location, the proposal does not have a conduct-regulation exception to venue based on
the place of injury. The conduct-regulation exception would let forum shopping continue while
Illinois courts sorted out which tort rules are conduct-regulating, and its issue-by-issue approach
does not work with venue.
364. Infra Appendix B §2-102.2(b).
365. Infra id.

366. See infra id. § 2-102.2(c) ("A 'place of conduct' is a county where the acts or omissions
giving rise to the cause of action occurred. If a county meets the place of conduct requirement,
and no county meets the requirements of paragraphs (a)-(b), this county has the greatest
connection to the occurrence and the parties, and venue is proper in this county. If more than one
county meets the place of conduct requirement, and no county meets the requirements of
paragraphs (a)-(b), each such county has the greatest connection to the occurrence and the
parties, and venue is proper in each such county.").
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manufactured it in a second county, both counties would be places of
conduct in a suit alleging both defective design and defective
manufacturing. 367
The proposal's place-of-conduct rule would give third priority to the
conduct-county's community judgment when there is no commonlocation county and the resulting injury occurred outside of Illinois.
This priority once again would resemble the priority that Illinois courts
give in conflict of laws decisions, which agree with the Second
Restatement's presumption in favor of the injury state, not the conduct
state. 368
Again, this proposal would translate the concept of community
judgment into venue rules. If one county meets the place-of-conduct
requirement, and no county meets the previous common-location and
place-of-injury requirements, the one "county has the greatest
connection to the occurrence and the parties and venue is proper in this
county." 3 69 If more than one county meets the place-of-conduct
requirement, and no county meets the previous common-location and
place-of-injury requirements, "each such county has the greatest
connection to the occurrence and the parties, and venue is proper in
each such county." 37 0 If no county meets the place-of-conduct
requirement, the search for the county (or counties) with the greatest
connection would continue to the final step.
4. Default Rule
At this point, the proposal would end the search by applying a default
rule. When no county could meet the common-location requirement,
the place-of-injury requirement, and the place-of-conduct requirement,
no county would have a strong claim to have tort liability resolved
according to its community judgment, making the community judgment
of any county about equally appropriate. For want of a venue with a
strong claim to resolve tort liability, the proposal would cross-reference
the general venue statute and declare that the county with the greatest
connection to the occurrence and the parties is "the county (or counties)
367. Products liability suits often allege that relevant design decisions were made at the
corporate headquarters, not at the place where the product was manufactured. See, e.g.,
Townsend, 879 N.E.2d at 895 (reciting allegations that relevant design decisions were made in
Illinois for a lawn tractor manufactured in South Carolina).
368. See Townsend, 879 N.E.2d at 904-05 (quoting Second Restatement § 146 & cmts. c & e
(1971)) ("[A] strong presumption exists that the law of the place of injury, Michigan, governs the
substantive issues herein, unless plaintiffs can demonstrate that Michigan bears little relation to
the occurrence and the parties. . . ."(emphasis in original)).
369. Infra Appendix B § 2-102.2(c).
370. Id.

822

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 43

where venue is proper under § 2-101 ."371 Under the convenience-based
proposals discussed in Part II, defendant-based venue would determine
the proper venue because transaction-based venue could not apply in
situations where the tortious conduct and the injury both occurred
outside Illinois.
C. The Effect on Forum Shopping

Adopting the proposed "most significant connection test" would have
a significant effect on reducing forum shopping in Illinois-an effect
that can be illustrated by applying this test to the facts of the Illinois
Supreme Court's last three intrastate forum non conveniens decisions.
In all three instances, the parties had engaged in forum shopping. The
most-significant-connection test would have prevented forum shopping
in all three instances by making venue proper in just one county.
The first decision is First American Bank v. Guerine,37 2 which
addressed an intrastate forum non conveniens issue in a wrongful death
suit based on an accident that happened when a trailer broke away from
the vehicle towing it and hit the victim's car head-on. 373 The accident
occurred in DeKalb County; the victim had resided in Kane County; the
defendant driver resided in Cook County; and the defendant trailer
manufacturer had its place of business in Indiana.3 7 4 The executor
alleged that the trailer was negligently towed, defectively designed, and
defectively manufactured. 375 The executor sued in Cook County, and
the trailer manufacturer sought an intrastate forum non conveniens
transfer to DeKalb County. 3 76
While the circuit court ordered the transfer, the Illinois Supreme
Court reversed the transfer order on the ground that a transfer should be
denied when the record shows "the potential trial witnesses are scattered
among several counties, including the plaintiffs chosen forum, and no
single county enjoys a predominant connection to the litigation." 377
After lamenting the time it had to spend "micromanaging errant forum

371. See infra id. § 2-102.2(d) ("If no county meets the requirements of paragraphs (a)-(c),
the county (or counties) with the greatest connection to the occurrence and the parties is the
county (or counties) where venue is proper under § 2-101 and venue is proper where it is proper
under § 2-101.").
372. 764 N.E.2d 54 (Ill. 2002).
373. Id at 56.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id
377. Id at 56, 64.
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rulings," the Supreme Court expressed the hope that its holding would
help clarify the intrastateforum non conveniens doctrine.3 7 8
Under the most-significant-connection test, the proper venue would
have been DeKalb County. This conclusion would have been arrived at
in two steps under the proposed rules. First, no county would meet the
common-location requirement. At the time of his death, the victim had
his regular dwelling place in Kane County, so the plaintiff executor
would be deemed located there. 379 The defendant driver would be
located in Cook County, where he had his regular dwelling place.38 0
Second, DeKalb County would meet the place-of-injury requirement,
because it is the county where the victim suffered the injury that killed
him.381 Accordingly, DeKalb County would unquestionably have the
greatest connection to the occurrence and the parties and venue would
be proper only in DeKalb County. No forum shopping could occur.
The second decision is Dawdy v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 382
which addressed an intrastate forum non conveniens issue in a personal
injury suit based on a collision between a truck and a tractor.383 The
collision occurred in Macoupin County; the victim resided in Greene
County; the defendant truck driver resided in Macoupin County; and the
defendant railroad, which employed the truck driver, did business in
Macoupin County and operated a facility in Madison County. 384 The
victim alleged that the accident resulted from negligent driving,
negligent training and supervision of the driver, and negligent
attachment of items extending beyond the truck's width.38 5 The victim
filed suit in Madison County, and the defendants sought an intrastate

378. Id at 60, 64.
379. Id. at 56; see also infra Appendix A § 2-102(c) ("The legal representative of a deceased
individual's estate is deemed located where, as of the time of death, the deceased individual had a
'regular dwelling place' or a 'regular work place' . . . .").
380. Guerine, 764 N.E.2d at 56; see also infra Appendix A § 2-102(a) ("An individual is
located in the county (or counties) where the individual has a regular dwelling place or a regular
work place."). These statements about location assume the parties had their regular dwelling
place where they resided and did not have a regular work place somewhere else. The decision
does not indicate where the trailer manufacturer was doing business in Illinois, which is where a
legal entity would be located when it has no place of business in Illinois. See infra Appendix A §
2-102(b)(4) (laying out different presence tests that courts would apply in a specified order to
determine the county (or counties) in which legal entities, including corporations, are located).
381. Guerine, 764 N.E.2d at 56; see also infra Appendix B § 2-102.2(b) (defining "place of
injury").
382. 797 N.E.2d 687 (111.
2003).
383. Id. at691.
384. Id. at692.
3 85. Id.
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forum non conveniens transfer to Macoupin County.3 86 While the
circuit court denied the transfer, the Illinois Supreme Court granted
transfer for two main reasons: (1) "none of the witnesses reside in
Madison County," and (2) "Macoupin County has a predominant
connection to this case." 387
Under the most-significant-connection test, the proper venue would
have been Macoupin County. This conclusion would have been arrived
at by a two-step inquiry under the proposed rules. First, no county
would meet the common-location requirement. At the time of the
accident, the victim had his regular dwelling place in Greene County,
and the defendant driver had his regular dwelling place in Macoupin
County.388 Second, Macoupin County would meet the place-of-injury
requirement because it is the county where the plaintiff suffered the
injury. 389 Accordingly, Macoupin County would have the greatest
connection to the occurrence and the parties and venue would be proper
only in Macoupin County. Again, no forum shopping could occur.
The third decision is Langenhorst v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.,
which addressed an intrastate forum non conveniens issue in a wrongful
death suit based base on a train-pickup truck collision at a railroad
crossing. 390 The accident occurred in Clinton County; the victim had
resided in Clinton County; the defendant railroad had track traversing
Clinton County and St. Clair County; the defendant division engineer
resided in Macon County; the defendant train conductor resided in
Indiana; and the defendant train engineer also resided in Indiana. 391
The special administrator alleged that the railroad violated state safety
regulations about railroad crossing maintenance. 392 The special
administrator sued in St. Clair County, and the defendants sought an
38 6. Id.
387. Id. at 700.
388. Id at 692; see also infra Appendix A § 2-102(a)(1) (explaining that "an individual is
located" in the county or counties where "the individual has a regular dwelling place or a regular
work place" and defining a "regular dwelling place" as "a place where, at the time the suit is
filed, the individual (i) is living, and (ii) has lived or intends to continue living for at least one
year"). Again, these statements about location assume the parties had their regular dwelling place
where they resided and did not have a regular work place somewhere else. The decision does not
indicate the relative size of the defendant railroad's places of business in Illinois, which would
determine where it is located. See infra id. § 2-102(b)(3)(1)-(3) (explaining presence tests and
the proper order in which courts should apply these presence tests to "legal entit[ies]" to
determine the county or counties in which these legal entities are located).
389. Dawdy, 797 N.E.2d at 691; see also infra Appendix B § 2-102.2(b) (defining "place of
injury").
390. Langenhorst v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 848 N.E.2d 927 (Ill. 2006).
391. Id at 929-30, 939.
392. Id at 929-31.
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intrastate forum non conveniens transfer to Clinton County.393 The
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial of transfer for two main
reasons: (i) "both St. Clair County and Clinton County have significant
ties to the case;" and (ii) "the potential witnesses are scattered
throughout several counties in the state, as well as Indiana and
Missouri." 39 4
Under the most-significant-connection test, the proper venue would
have been Clinton County. This conclusion would have been arrived at
in two steps under the proposed rules. First, no county would meet the
common-location requirement. At the time of his death, the victim had
his regular dwelling place in Clinton County, so the plaintiffs special
administrator would be deemed located there. 395 The defendant
division engineer had his regular dwelling place in Macon County; and
the defendant train conductor and the defendant train engineer had their
regular dwelling places in Indiana.396 Second, Clinton County would
meet the place-of-injury requirement because it is where the victim
suffered the injury that killed him.397 Accordingly, Clinton County
would have the greatest connection to the occurrence and the parties and
venue would be proper only in Clinton County. Once again, no forum
shopping could occur.
CONCLUSION

Illinois's general venue statute should be amended. The statute's
defendant-convenience and witness-convenience purposes are poorly
served by venue rules that reasonable persons who believe in these
purposes cannot defend. These rules lead to far too much costly forum
shopping, and their political effect is worse. Business-oriented groups
have concluded that the venue rules applicable to them are designed
393. Id. at 929, 931.
394. Id. at 937.

395. Id. at 929; see also infra Appendix A § 2-102(c) ("The legal representative of a deceased
individual's estate is deemed located where, as of the time of death, the deceased individual had a
'regular dwelling place' or a 'regular work place' .... ).
396. Langenhorst, 848 N.E.2d at 930; see also infra Appendix A § 2-102(a)(1) (explaining
that "an individual is located" in the county or counties where "the individual has a regular
dwelling place or a regular work place" and defining a "regular dwelling place"). Again, these
statements about location assume the parties had their regular dwelling place where they resided
and did not have a regular work place somewhere else. The decision does not indicate the
relative size of the defendant railroad's places of business in Illinois, which would determine
where it would be located. Infra Appendix A § 2-102(b)(3)(l)-3) (explaining presence tests and
the proper order in which courts should apply these presence tests to "legal entit[ies]" to
determine the county or counties in which these legal entities are located).
397. Langenhorst, 848 N.E.2d at 929-30; see also infra Appendix B § 2-102.2(b) (defining
"place of injury").
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mainly to give plaintiffs in personal injury suits regular access to venues
with socioeconomic characteristics favorable to plaintiffs. The groups'
anger at this skewed administration of justice leads to nasty rhetoric
("Judicial Hellholes") and the advocacy of tort reform measures that
have nothing to do with forum shopping-measures that, in this writer's
opinion, are worse than the disease of forum shopping.
The time has come to restore confidence in the administration of
justice by reforming Illinois venue laws. The adoption of the
convenience-based proposals offered here would point Illinois in the
right direction. True, in an era when advances in transportation and
communication have shrunk the effective distances between different
parts of the State, these convenience-based proposals, like any proposals
of this type, would make multiple venues proper in many cases. Forum
shopping would continue, albeit at a reduced pace. At the very least,
however, reasonable persons could defend our venue rules with a
straight face.
The anti-forum shopping proposals should be adopted to fully restore
confidence in the administration of justice. These proposals, derived
from Illinois conflict-of-laws decisions, would curb forum shopping in a
way that is fair to both sides and respectful of the counties' different
community judgments about tort liability. The counties where the
community judgment favors greater tort liability would no longer decide
disputes that should properly be decided in a different county, according
to that county's judgment. On the other hand, in disputes that should
properly be decided in a county where the community judgment favors
greater tort liability, this county's community judgment would
determine the matter unhampered by tort reform measures. If these
proposals both anger the plaintiffs bar and disappoint business-oriented
groups, so be it.
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APPENDIX A: CONVENIENCE-BASED PROPOSALS
§ 2-101. Generally. Every action must be commenced in a county
where venue is proper under paragraphs (a), (b), or (c), except as
otherwise provided by special venue statutes or by a valid agreement
about forum selection.
(a) Venue is proper in the county (or counties) where the greatest
number of defendants is located.
(b) Venue is proper in the county (or counties) where the transaction
occurred that gave rise to the cause of action.
(c) If there is no county where venue is proper under paragraphs (a)(b), venue is proper in any county.
§ 2-102. Defendant-Based Venue. The following rules determine
where defendants are located and which are counted to determine where
the greatest number of defendants is located.
(a) An individual is located in the county (or counties) where the
individual has a regular dwelling place or a regular work place.
(1) A "regular dwelling place" is a place where, at the time the suit is
filed, the individual (i) is living, and (ii) has lived or intends to continue
living for at least one year.
(2) A "regular work place" is a place where, at the time the suit is
filed, the individual (i) is working or physically reporting for work, (ii)
has worked or physically reported for work for at least one year, and
(iii) has worked or physically reported for work on at least 150 days
during the preceding one-year period.
(3) A regular dwelling place or a regular work place remains such a
place during a temporary absence that is intended to last, and has lasted,
for less than a year.
(b) A legal entity-including any type of corporation, partnership, or
unincorporated association-is located in the county (or counties)
identified by the following presence tests applied in the specified order.
(1) The legal entity is located in the county (or counties) where it has
50 or more regular workers at its place or places of business. An
individual is a "regular worker" if, at the time the suit is filed, the
individual (i) is working for the legal entity in any capacity, including as
an employee, sole proprietor, partner, or independent contractor; (ii) has
worked or physically reported for work at the place for at least one year;
and (iii) has worked or physically reported for work at the place on at
least 150 days during the preceding one-year period.
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(2) If no county meets the test of subparagraph (1), the legal entity is
located in the county (or counties) where it has 10 or more regular
workers (see subparagraph (1)) at its place or places of business.
(3) If no county meets the tests of subparagraphs (1)-(2), the legal
entity is located in the county (or counties) where the legal entity has a
place of business.
(4) If no county meets the tests of subparagraphs (1)-(3), the legal
entity is located in the county (or counties) where the legal entity is
doing business.
(c) The legal representative of a minor or a legally disabled
individual is deemed located where, at the time the suit is filed, the
minor or the legally disabled individual has a "regular dwelling place"
or a "regular work place" (see paragraph (a)). The legal representative
of a deceased individual's estate is deemed located where, as of the time
of death, the deceased individual had a "regular dwelling place" or a
"regular work place" (see paragraph (a)).
(d) The following four counting rules determine where the greatest
number of defendants is located.
(1) A defendant counts if, and only if, it was sued in compliance with
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137.
(2) A defendant counts in each county where it is located.
(3) A dismissal-voluntary or involuntary-does not change whether
a defendant counts.
(4) In case of a tie between counties for the greatest number of
defendants, each such county is deemed a county where the greatest
number of defendants is located.
§ 2-102.1. Transaction-Based Venue. The transaction that gave
rise to the cause of action is deemed to have occurred where any matter
occurred that the plaintiff has the burden of proving, except that venue
cannot be based on the accrual of an expense claimed as money
damages.
§ 2-103. Specially. In certain actions, the following special venue
rules apply.
(a) If the corporate limits of a city, village or town extend into more
than one county, the municipality may file an ordinance enforcement
action-whether seeking a fine, imprisonment, penalty, or forfeiture,
and regardless of where the violation occurred-in either the county
where its clerk's office is located or a county where at least 35% of the
territory within its corporate limits is located. [Transferred, as
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modified, from chapter 735, act 5, section 2-101 of the Illinois
Code.]
(b)-(e) [No changes from chapter 735, act 5, section 2-103 of the
Illinois Code.]
(f) If a check, draft, money order, or other instrument for the payment
of child support payable to or delivered to the State Disbursement Unit
established under Section 10-26 of the Illinois Public Aid Code is
returned by the bank or depository for any reason, venue for the
enforcement of any criminal proceedings or civil cause of action for
recovery (including recovery of attorney fees) shall be in the county
where the principal office of the State Disbursement Unit is located.
[Transferred, as modified, from chapter 735, act 5, section 2-101 of
I
the Illinois Code.]
(g) In an action brought by a business against a consumer who was
physically present in the State for part or all of the transaction, venue
cannot be based on a matter that did not involve the consumer's
physical presence. A "business" is an individual or a legal entity that
sells, leases, lends, or enters into a transaction in the ordinary course of
the individual's or legal entity's trade or business. A "consumer" is an
individual who buys, leases, borrows, or enters into a transaction
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
§ 2-104. Wrong venue-Waiver-Motion to transfer.
(a) [No changes from chapter 735, act 5, section 2-104 of the
Illinois Code.]
(b) A defendant waives all venue objections by failing to make a
timely motion to transfer the action to a proper venue. A "timely"
motion means a motion made:
(1) on or before the date upon which the defendant is required to
appear, or within any further time that may be granted to answer or
move with respect to the complaint;
(2) promptly, if the addition of a new defendant changes the county
(or counties) with the greatest number of defendants; or
(3) promptly, if the addition of a new cause of action requires
severance and transfer because venue is improper on the new cause of
action.
(c) [No changes from chapter 735, act 5, section 2-104 of the
Illinois Code.]
§ 2-105. Preserving objections. Following the denial of a motion to
transfer, no further step is required to preserve for appeal the venue
objections that were included in the motion.
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§ 2-106. Transfer. [No changes from chapter 735, act 5, section 2106 of the Illinois Code.]
§ 2-107. Costs and expenses of transfer. The costs attending a
transfer shall be taxed by the clerk of the transferring court, and,
together with the filing fee in the transferee court, shall be paid by the
plaintiff. If the transferring court finds that venue was fixed in violation
of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137, the transferring court may order the
plaintiff to pay the reasonable expenses, including a reasonable
attorney's fee, that the defendant incurred in attending and obtaining a
transfer. If the costs and expenses are not paid within a reasonable time,
the transferring court shall on motion dismiss the action. [Transferred,
as modified, from chapter 735, act 5, section 2-107 of the Illinois
Code.]
APPENDIX

B: THE ANTI-FORUM SHOPPING PROPOSAL

§ 2-102.2. Venue in Higher-Value Personal Injury & Wrongful
Death Actions. This special venue statute applies to all actions for
injury to the person or wrongful death that seek money damages
exceeding the amount specified in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 222. In
these actions, venue is proper in the county (or counties) with the
greatest connection to the occurrence and the parties according to
paragraphs (a)-(d).
(a) A "common location" is a county where all plaintiffs and all
defendants were located when the transaction occurred that gave rise to
the cause of action. The location rules of § 2-102(a)-(c) determine a
party's location, except these rules are applied to the facts at the time of
the transaction. If a county meets the common location requirement,
this county has the greatest connection to the occurrence and the parties
and venue is proper in this county. If more than one county meets the
common location requirement, each such county has the greatest
connection to the occurrence and the parties and venue is proper in each
such county.
(b) A "place of injury" is a county where the injury giving rise to the
cause of action occurred. In a wrongful death suit, a "place of injury" is
a county where the injury was suffered that caused the death, not the
county where death occurred. If a county meets the place of injury
requirement, and no county meets the requirement of paragraph (a), this
county has the greatest connection to the occurrence and the parties and
venue is proper in this county. If more than one county meets the place
of injury requirement, and no county meets the requirement of
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paragraph (a), each such county has the greatest connection to the
occurrence and the parties and venue is proper in each such county.
(c) A "place of conduct" is a county where the acts or omissions
giving rise to the cause of action occurred. If a county meets the place
of conduct requirement, and no county meets the requirements of
paragraphs (a}-(b), this county has the greatest connection to the
occurrence and the parties, and venue is proper in this county. If more
than one county meets the place of conduct requirement, and no county
meets the requirements of paragraphs (a)-(b), each such county has the
greatest connection to the occurrence and the parties, and venue is
proper in each such county.
(d) If no county meets the requirements of paragraphs (a)-(c), the
county (or counties) with the greatest connection to the occurrence and
the parties is the county (or counties) where venue is proper under § 2101, and venue is proper where it is proper under § 2-101.

